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A productive school produces high achievement in its pupils for each dollar
it spends. Formally, a school’s productivity is deﬁned as achievement per
dollar spent, controlling for incoming achievement diﬀerences of its stu-
dents. In this chapter, I comprehensively review how school choice might
aﬀect productivity. I begin by describing the importance of school produc-
tivity, then explain the economic logic that suggests that choice will aﬀect
productivity, and ﬁnish by presenting much of the available evidence on
school choice and school productivity. Readers are likely to be most in-
trigued by the ﬁnal section of the paper, in which I examine the achievement
and productivity eﬀects of three important recent choice reforms: vouchers
in Milwaukee, charter schools in Michigan, and charter schools in Arizona.
However, readers are much less likely to ﬁnd the evidence to be a “black
box” if they read the earlier sections of the paper, which set up the relation-
ship between choice, school conduct, student achievement, and productiv-
ity. I encourage impatient readers who jump to the ﬁnal section to return to
the earlier sections for answers to the questions that will naturally arise once
they have seen the evidence.
8.1 Why the Productivity Consequences of School Choice Matter A Lot
Although a great deal of research has dealt indirectly with school pro-
ductivity (most famously, the “does money matter?” debate), productivity
has been neglected by research on school choice. School choice research has
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ate of the National Bureau of Economic Research.ercises school choice? Who chooses which school? How does choice change
the allocation of resources? How does reallocation of students change peer
eﬀects? The allocation questions are largely questions of redistribution. Al-
though it is theoretically possible that school choice could improve achieve-
ment for all students through reallocation, such an outcome would require
that, for every student, the beneﬁts of going to a school that was a better
match exceed the costs imposed upon him or her by school choice. The costs
might include a worse peer group or a decline in resources.1
In general, then, allocation-oriented research presents a view of school
choice that is rife with tensions about redistribution (which students gain,
and which students lose?). One way to relieve these tensions is to devise al-
location-related remedies, such as controls on how resources and peers shift
when choice is introduced (see, e.g. Hoxby 2001). However, when advocates
of school choice argue that every child would beneﬁt from school choice,
they are usually relying on the idea that school productivity would increase
suﬃciently to swamp any negative allocation eﬀects that some students
might experience. The basic logic is that choice would give schools greater
incentives to be productive because less productive schools would lose stu-
dents to more productive schools. That is, if a school could raise a student’s
achievement while spending the same amount as the current school, it
would be expected to draw the student away from his or her current school.
This process would shrink the less productive and expand the more pro-
ductive school, until one of two things happened: the more productive re-
placed the less productive school or the less productive school raised its pro-
ductivity and was thereby able to maintain its population of students. (This
is the broad idea: later I discuss speciﬁc mechanisms through which choice
might raise productivity.) In other words, a general increase in school pro-
ductivity could be a rising tide that lifted all boats, and the gains and losses
from reallocation might be nothing more than crests and valleys on the sur-
face of the much higher water level.
Thus, the ﬁrst reason that the productivity consequences of school choice
matter is that they potentially determine whether choice will beneﬁt all chil-
dren. For the rising tide scenario to be a realistic probability and not just a
possibility, however, one must ask what productivity schools could reason-
ably be expected to achieve. That is, what is the range of productivity over
which choice could cause productivity to vary? Recent history suggests that
school productivity could be much higher than it is now—60 to 70 percent
288 Caroline M. Hoxby
1. Strictly speaking, what is required is that (a) the current distribution of peers or teaching
methods is inoptimal and (b) that school choice would cause people to redistribute themselves
in such a way that a Pareto improvement in the distribution of peers or teaching methods
would occur. It is reasonable to think that families might redistribute themselves so as to
achieve better alignment between teaching methods and their children’s learning styles. It is
less reasonable to think that families, acting independently, could implement a Pareto im-
provement in peer eﬀects.higher. Consider the simplest productivity calculation, achievement per
dollar. Such a calculation (which I later describe in detail) suggests that av-
erage public school productivity was about 65 percent higher in 1970–71
than in 1998–99. This means that, if choice were simply to restore school
productivity to its 1970–71 level, then the average student in the United
States would be scoring at an advanced level where fewer than 10 percent of
students now score. This improvement in achievement would be so large
that it would overwhelm any worst-case scenario suggested by allocation re-
search on school choice.
8.1.1 How Much Higher Could School Productivity Plausibly Be?
How does one make such a calculation? We have one measure of student
achievement in the United States that reﬂects the achievement of the entire
population of students, is nationally representative, and is designed for
comparison over a long period of time and across schools: the National As-
sessment of Educational Progress (NAEP). Other measures of achievement
tend to fail at least one, usually a few, of these requirements.2 If one simply
calculates NAEP points per thousand real dollars spent per pupil, one gen-
erates the results shown in table 8.1.3(All money amounts in this chapter are
adjusted into 1999 dollars using the Consumer Price Index, unless other-
wise indicated.) They show that, between the 1970–71 and 1998–99 school
years, productivity fell by between 54.9 percent (based on math tests for
nine-year-olds) and 73.4 percent (based on reading tests for seventeen-year-
olds). The bottom section of table 8.1 shows actual NAEP scores in its up-
per row and, in its lower row, what NAEP scores would be if schools re-
turned to 1970–71 productivity (1972–73 productivity, in the case of math).
For all of the tests, the average American student would have a score that
fewer than 10 percent of American students currently attain. In fact, the
average seventeen-year-old would have a score that fewer than 5 percent of
American seventeen-year-olds currently attain. The mean American stu-
dent would be classiﬁed by the NAEP as an advanced student.
One might wonder whether demographic changes in the United States
account for the fall in school productivity, as measured by the simple cal-
culation described above. Perhaps schools were not losing productivity;
perhaps they were simply working with students from worse family back-
grounds. There is no deﬁnitive way to address this issue, but a standard ap-
proach is to do the following:
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2. The high school dropout rate, for instance, only reﬂects variation in the outcomes of low-
achieving students. Students’ self-selecting into the tests generates incurable biases when the
Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) or ACT (formerly known as the American College Testing
Program) is used for comparisons over time or across schools. The SAT and ACT also only re-
ﬂect variation in the outcomes of high-achieving students. High school grades have been
shown to be relative measures that cannot be compared successfully across schools.































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.• regress 1998–99 achievement on the characteristics of students who
took the test in that year and thereby determine the eﬀect of each char-
acteristic (African American, Hispanic, single-parent family, family in-
come, and so on);
• predict what achievement would have been in 1998–99 if the student
population were the same as the 1970–71 student population—that is,
substitute 1970–71 characteristics into the prediction equation with
1998–99 coeﬃcients; and
• use predicted achievement to determine what 1998–99 productivity
would have been if the student population had remained what it was in
1970–71.4
If one uses this method to hold student characteristics constant, then one
ﬁnds that the decline in productivity from 1970 to 1999 is very slightly larger
than the unadjusted estimates would suggest. See the row of table 8.1 in
which productivity decrease is adjusted for demographics. For instance,
consider the measured decrease in productivity based on the mathematics
scores of seventeen-year-olds. It is a 62.0 percent decrease if student char-
acteristics are not held constant, but it is a 65.1 percent decrease if student
characteristics are held constant.5 The decline in productivity is greater
when one holds student characteristics constant mainly because a smaller
share of students had high school graduate or college graduate parents in
1971–72 than in 1998–99. Such students tend to score better on the NAEP
exam than students whose parents are high school dropouts. In addition,
there were smaller shares of students in 1971–72 whose families had the in-
comes typical of families today. The shares of students who are African
American and Hispanic have risen since 1971–72, and these students do
tend to score worse on NAEP exam than non-Hispanic white students.
However, the eﬀect of changing racial composition is overwhelmed by the
eﬀect of changes in parents’ education and income. Other changes in the
composition of the student population, such as area of the country, have
little eﬀect on the adjustment.
If demographic changes do not account for the fall in school productiv-
ity, perhaps changes in career opportunities for women do. That is, over the
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4. The calculation is




















where  is productivity, X1973is the vector of characteristics of the 1971–72 student population,
pps1998 is per-pupil spending in 1998–99, and   ˆ is the vector of estimated coeﬃcients from the
regression
NAEP1998–99   X1998–99  1998–99   ε.
NAEP1998 is a 1998–99 NAEP score (in reading, math, or science) and X1998 is the vector of
characteristics of the 1998–99 student population.
5. The source of data for the calculations described in U.S. Department of Education (1999).1970–99 period, it may have cost schools an increasing amount to hire a fe-
male with a given level of skills because non-teaching opportunities for
women were opening up. One can examine this hypothesis by inﬂating nom-
inal spending using a wage index for females rather the CPI. In order to give
this hypothesis as much explanatory power as possible, I used the wage in-
dex for females in the college-educated occupation that experienced the
most wage growth: professional specialty occupations (lawyers, physicians,
etc.).6 Use of this index exaggerates the degree to which females’ wages
account for the measured decline in productivity for two reasons. First,
women in professional specialty occupations have always had higher-
quality educations and higher ability than the average American school
teacher, and highly skilled and able workers have experienced rapid earn-
ings growth relative to all other workers (including less skilled college grad-
uates) since 1970. Second, teachers are not the only input that schools re-
quire. They also need oﬃce  equipment, buildings, less skilled service
workers (custodians, bus drivers, food preparers), and other inputs; the
prices of such inputs have not risen nearly as fast as the wages of female pro-
fessional specialty workers. As long as we recognize that inﬂating by female
professional specialty workers’ wages is likely to give us a smaller decrease
in productivity than has really occurred, the calculation is informative. The
row in table 8.1 in which productivity increase is adjusted to the wages of
females with advanced degrees shows that the wage-adjusted decrease in
productivity ranges from 39.1 to 57.6 percent, whereas the CPI-based de-
crease in productivity ranges from 54.9 to 73.4 percent. In other words, al-
though the wage-adjusted productivity losses are smaller, they are still very
substantial.
The facts suggest that school conduct, not changing student characteris-
tics or female career opportunities, is the main source of the decline in pro-
ductivity. Consequently, policies that improve school conduct could poten-
tially generate very large increases in productivity.7 Of course, it is not
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6. Earnings of full-time, full-year females working in professional specialty occupations are
taken from U.S. Department of Commerce (1976, 1983, 1995, 1999). The index is for women
in a constant age range. However, experience is not held constant. Because women have been
gaining more experience for every year they age (they have spent less time out of the labor force
for family reasons), using an index that holds experience (not age) constant would produce re-
sults that look more like the results using the CPI. This is yet another reason why the produc-
tivity loss shown in the row of table 8.1 that is adjusted for wages of females with advanced de-
grees is understated.
7. One could criticize the constant-student productivity by saying that some student char-
acteristics mean diﬀerent things in 1998 from in 1971. For instance, coming from a single-
parent family is more common in 1998 than in 1971, and thus it may be a diﬀerent experience
now from what it was in 1971. On the whole, however, such criticisms work in the wrong di-
rection. Most of the student characteristics that are more common now than in the past are
also less stigmatized—being a member of minority or being from a single-parent family, from
the South or Southwest, and so on. The decline in productivity would be larger if one were to
take account of the fact that having a single-parent household, say, is not as bad for achieve-
ment as it was in 1971.enough to point out that school productivity could plausibly be much
higher than it is. One must investigate whether choice actually induces
schools to raise productivity. Such investigations—both how one conducts
them and what they show—are the main content of this paper. Before I take
up such matters, however, one more vital point about school productivity
must be made.
8.1.2 How School Productivity Aﬀects American Industry and Growth
For as long as we have been able measure the factor content of American
net exports and the sources of American economic growth, they have been
intensive in human capital. This was observed early on by Leontief (1956)
and conﬁrmed by a series of other researchers (Keesing 1966; Krueger
1968; Jorgenson 1984; and Jorgenson and Fraumeni 1989, 1992). In other
words, the United States has a comparative advantage in producing goods
and services that make intensive use of educated labor. This comparative
advantage has existed because America has always had a relative abun-
dance of educated labor. That is, the United States has always been able to
produce education in its population relatively cheaply. America’s “new
economy” products (microprocessors, software, knowledge services) are
some of the most human capital–intensive products in the world. However,
we know from basic trade theory that the human capital–intensive econ-
omy is built on a foundation of American ability to produce education in its
population relatively cheaply. Although it true that America can import
some human capital (for instance, software engineers), imported human
capital cannot be a source of comparative advantage in the middle to long
run.8Thus, if Americans wish to continue enjoying a growing economy that
is centered around human capital–intensive products, they cannot be indi-
ﬀerent about rapidly falling productivity in their schools. A school sector
with falling productivity translates into America’s having relatively costly
human capital, which translates into a loss of comparative advantage in hu-
man capital–intensive goods.
In short, the eﬀect of choice on school productivity is not interesting
simply because it could overwhelm the allocation eﬀects of choice on
achievement; it is interesting because it also has broad implications for the
macroeconomy, for trade, and for Americans’ jobs.
8.2 How Productivity Fits into the School Choice Literature
The productivity implications of choice have been sadly neglected by the
literature on school choice. This neglect has nothing to do with the impor-
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8. Other countries can import human capital too, so imported human capital cannot be
cheap relative to its cost in the rest of the world. Moreover, under a logical extension of cur-
rent trends, countries that are currently net exporters of human capital would become the
world’s net exporters of human capital–intensive products.tance of productivity (which is great, as has been discussed) and has every-
thing to do with the roots of the theoretical literature. Models of school
choice have grown out of models of local public goods provision, which
have traditionally focused exclusively on allocation problems, such as who
gets what local public good and how one person’s local public good choice
aﬀects other people. This focus has been inherited by the school choice lit-
erature, and although allocation-focused models of choice are instructive,
the intellectual history of the literature should not dictate neglect of pro-
ductivity. Indeed, it is worth while to take a step back to look at some related
research that demonstrates how important productivity eﬀects can be when
competition is introduced into a market.
Health care is an obvious and recent example. Legislation passed in the
late 1980s and early 1990s allowed managed care organizations to com-
pete.9 The competition has aﬀected the allocation of health care, but a
wealth of research also documents the dramatic eﬀects of competition on
the productivity, which far exceeded what supporters of managed care had
hoped. From 1990 to 2000, health care costs grew just one-half as quickly
as in the previous decade, but key health indicators (such as life span) grew
just as rapidly in the 1990s as in the 1980s. These facts suggest that produc-
tivity surged in the more competitive environment,10 in part because com-
petition induced providers to adopt eﬃciency-enhancing technology (such
as computers that reduce paperwork) and to discourage conduct that cre-
ated rents (such as doctors’ referring patients to their friends without regard
to cost). It should be noted that market competition was associated with
productivity gains in nonproﬁt and public hospitals, as well as private hos-
pitals.
Trucking and parcel services are other examples. Many researchers have
documented how, following deregulation in the 1970s, competition in
trucking grew dramatically. The result was a sharp increase in productivity,
as documented by Rose (1987), Michel and Shaked (1987), Traynor and
McCarthy (1991), and others. For the same money, a trucking customer
could obtain faster, more specialized service after competition than before.
In parcel services, the introduction of competition improved productivity
not only because the private ﬁrms (United Parcel Services, Federal Express,
DHL Worldwide Express, etc.) had higher productivity and productivity
growth than the U.S. Postal Service did. The competition also induced the
U.S. Postal Service to raise substantially its own productivity. Many com-
mentators had doubted whether the U.S. Postal Service could rise to the oc-
casion and compete, but it has maintained a large market share in parcel de-
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9. Managed care organizations include health maintenance organizations, primary provider
networks, and certain other physician and hospital networks.
10. See Economic Report of the President(2000). The literature on the productivity eﬀects of
managed care is voluminous, but Cutler and Sheiner (1998) may serve as a good introduction
to it.livery—largely by introducing services (like express mail and priority par-
cel post) that are competitive on price and quality with services oﬀered by
the private ﬁrms.
In fact, it is somewhat odd that school productivity should be so neg-
lected in the school choice literature, because—although productivity was
also neglected in the local public goods literature—there is increasing in-
terest among economists in the productivity of not-for-proﬁt, semipublic,
and regulated enterprises. Economists are increasingly interested in giving
market-like incentives to such enterprises in order to keep workers from
rent-seeking despite the fact that they lack conventional proﬁt-maximizing
incentives. For instance, yardstick competition among not-for-proﬁt pro-
viders of social services (awarding contracts to training programs on the ba-
sis of their performance relative to other sites) is increasingly used as a
method of inducing productivity gains.
Finally, it is worth noting that one type of school-related research does
implicitly contain substantial evidence on productivity, although produc-
tivity is rarely mentioned and productivity calculations are never made. I re-
fer to research that compares students’ outcomes in public and private
schools and that attempts to eliminate selection bias. (Selection bias is the
potential bias caused by the fact that students who self-select into private
schools might be unobservably diﬀerent from students who remain in
public schools.) The body of research on this topic is well established and
even includes some recent research comparing students who are assigned
by lotterya private school voucher or no voucher (so that they remain in the
public schools). Peterson et al. (chap. 4 in this volume) illustrate the best
strain of such research. The consensus in public versus private achievement
research appears to be that private schools produce statistically signiﬁ-
cantly better achievement, at least among minority children and children
from lower- to lower-middle-income households.
This body of research could be reformulated as a comparison of public
and private school productivity, because there is always an attempt to com-
pare achievement and hold constant the quality of student inputs. Unfor-
tunately, other inputs, especially spending, are notconstant between private
and public schools, and this body of research is often silent about this fact
(and almost never controls for it). In particular, the typical private school in
the United States spends only about 60 percent as much per pupil as the
typical public school, but private school spending is also much more vari-
able than is public school spending, so that minimum private school spend-
ing is lower than minimum public school spending and maximum private
school spending is higher than maximum public school spending. Thus,
even if researchers were to ﬁnd that public and private schools produced
identical achievement, it would probably be true that private schools were
considerably more productive (because they spend less on average). How-
ever, if one is to get an accurate comparison of public and private school
School Choice and School Productivity 295productivity, one really ought to make a productivity calculation for each
school (thereby taking account of diﬀerences in the distribution of spend-
ing) and compare these calculations for students with the same back-
grounds.
8.3 Why Should Choice Aﬀect School Productivity?
Why, logically, should choice be expected to aﬀect productivity? That is,
what mechanism guarantees that low-productivity producers will be driven
out by high-productivity producers? Ultimately, this is a question about (a)
what schooling producers maximize and (b) what the production function
for schooling is like. In fact, there are several answers to this question, and
the answer is diﬀerent for diﬀerent types of schooling producers: for-proﬁt
ﬁrms (like Edison Schools), not-for-proﬁt private schools, charter schools,
and regular public schools. In this section, I describe the mechanism by
which choice might aﬀect productivity for each of these types of schools.
Across all the cases, I do maintain one assumption: For any given cost to
them, parents will choose the school that produces the schooling that they
value most. For convenience, I will hereafter call what parents value in
schools “school quality,” but I do not assert that parents’ notion of school
quality necessarily matches that of the reader. In other work (Hoxby 1999a)
I have presented empirical evidence that suggests that parents tend to pre-
fer schools that have better academic achievement, emphasize academic
standards, and promote a relatively structured (disciplined) school atmos-
phere.
8.3.1 A For-Proﬁt School Producer That
TakesU pCharter School Contracts
Let us start with a very straightforward case: a for-proﬁt ﬁrm that opens
a charter school. Such a case is fairly typical of Edison Schools and might
become a common model if charter school programs were more widely en-
acted. The fee that the school could charge would be set by law, and parents
would not be able to “top up” the fee. Also assume that the school must ac-
cept charter school applicants at random (a typical charter school restric-
tion) and is risk neutral. In other words, a plan to include or exclude stu-
dents cannot be part of the school’s proﬁt maximization strategy.
Then, the school would solve a problem such as
(1) maxq,l,k  px(q) – c(q, l, w, k, r)x(q).
This problem simply says that the school maximizes the diﬀerence between
revenues (the ﬁxed fee p times the number of students who enroll x) and
costs (per-pupil costs c times the number of students who enroll x). The
school chooses the quality qthat it oﬀers, the staﬀor labor lthat it hires, and
the other inputs k that it employs (textbooks, equipment, and so on). The
296 Caroline M. Hoxbyschool accepts the going wage rate for staﬀ w and the going price for other
school inputs r. Per-pupil costs c are assumed to be increasing in quality,
staﬀhired, and other inputs purchased. I have assumed that per-pupil costs
are the same regardless of the school’s scale. This is a good starting as-
sumption, but it is probably not true. I relax it below.
Given that we have said that parents choose the school that oﬀers the
highest quality for a given price, it is clear that enrollment x is increasing in
quality q. Speciﬁcally, the school enrolls all of the public school students in
an area if it oﬀers quality that is higher than that of any other area charter
school or regular public school (which would be equally free to parents).
That is,
(2) x(qj∗)  ∑
N
t 1
1 if qj∗   qj j∗ for all j,
x(qj∗)   0 if qj∗   qj j∗ for any j.
Assume that the school shares equally in enrollment if it oﬀers exactly the
same quality as another school.
In these circumstances, the best that the school can do is maximize qual-
ity subject to the constraint that its per-pupil cost must not exceed the char-
ter school fee. Put another way, the school must maximize its productivity
for a given cost, or another school will enroll all of the students in the area.
Unproductive schools will be driven from the market. Note that the ﬁrm
earns just enough proﬁt on each student to repay its shareholders a market
rate of return for the use of their capital, so the best it can do is maximize
the number of students on whom it earns this slim proﬁt. It does this by
oﬀering the highest possible quality that the charter school fee can sustain.
Managers of for-proﬁt schooling ﬁrms believe that there are economies
of scale in schooling because a ﬁrm can pay lower prices for its inputs if it
pools purchasing, curricular research and development, and information
processing across multiple schools.11 If there are economies of scale, then
large ﬁrms may be able to earn economic proﬁts (proﬁts that exceed the
proﬁts necessary to pay the cost of capital) in local markets where they com-
pete with other schools that, for one reason or another, remain too small to
take advantage of economies of scale.
8.3.2 A For-Proﬁt School That Takes Up Vouchers
The case of a for-proﬁt school producer that takes voucher students is
quite similar to the case just examined, except that parents are assumed to
be allowed to top up a voucher with extra tuition payments from their own
funds. Otherwise, assume that the case is the same: The school must accept
voucher applicants on a random basis conditional upon the applicants’
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11. Pooling may occur even if the schools are in diﬀerent areas and oﬀer somewhat diﬀerent
levels of quality.being willing to pay the school’s fees with a combination of the voucher and
extra tuition payments. Because the school can now set its fees, its problem
is slightly more complicated:
(3) maxp,q,l,k  px(p, q) – c(x, q, l, w, k, r)x(p, q).
That is, when a school sets its fees, it takes into account that a higher fee
means, on the one hand, greater revenue per student who enrolls but, on the
other hand, lower enrollment (because a higher fee discourages enrollment
for any given level of quality oﬀered by the school). It can easily be seen
that, for any given fee p, the school must maximize the quality it produces
subject to the constraint that costs are less than or equal to p. In other
words, the school must still maximize productivity if it is not to lose all its
enrollment to another school that oﬀers higher quality for the same price.
Note that, in the equation above, I have allowed for economies of scale.
Thus, when a school considers aiming for a “better” but smaller niche of
parents, who are willing to be charged higher fees for better quality, it must
take into account the loss of economies of scale (and the consequent in-
crease in its costs).
8.3.3 A Nonproﬁt School That Takes Up Charter School Contracts
The for-proﬁt case is a nice place to begin because the ﬁrm’s incentives to
maximize productivity are obvious. The vast majority of school producers
that take up charter school contracts or voucher students are, however, not-
for-proﬁts. At ﬁrst glance, it might seem diﬃcult to say what not-for-proﬁts
maximize, but in fact relatively simple modiﬁcations of the for-proﬁt case
capture not-for-proﬁt behavior. The key diﬀerence between a nonproﬁt and
a for-proﬁt organization is the distribution of surplus.12 A for-proﬁt school
distributes proﬁts to its owners (private owners or shareholders). Thus, in
the problem above, it was reasonable to assume straightforward proﬁt max-
imization because owners beneﬁt directly from proﬁts. If a not-for-proﬁt
school has surplus (a diﬀerence between revenues and costs), it cannot pay
them in a straightforward way to anyone. It can, however, use surplus in a
variety of ways that make surplus a valuable thing to have. Surplus can be
used to make working conditions pleasant for the school’s staﬀ (staﬀ
lunches, smaller classes, more classroom supplies, and so on) even if these
conditions do not contribute to productivity. Surplus also allows a school
to pursue social goals that its staﬀ value: experiments with teaching meth-
ods, development of new curricula, a diverse student body, the exposing of
students to nature. There are a few things to note about such distributions
of surplus. First, they are nearly always ineﬃcient compared to distribution
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12. This point has been discussed by numerous researchers. See Glaeser and Shleifer (forth-
coming) for a recent model of nonproﬁt entrepreneurs and for a review of the literature.of cash (which is fungible). That is, some of the surplus is lost in the process
of being transformed into goods or services that the staﬀvalues. As a result,
the school staﬀ faces weaker incentives than they would face if they could
be given cash incentives. Second, although it is relatively simple to distrib-
ute a nonproﬁt school’s surplus to its staﬀin the forms mentioned, it is diﬃ-
cult to distribute it (legally) to a single owner or even a concentrated subset
of the staﬀ. Thus, a school has less incentive to expand simply to increase
the absolute size of the surplus: The surplus will increase as it expands, but
so will the number of staﬀ over whom the surplus must be divided. This is
unlike the for-proﬁt situation where owners have an incentive to expand
their schooling production so long as they can earn some positive surplus
on each additional enrollee.
One can incorporate these features of the distribution of surplus into a





   
where enrollment is given by
(5) x(qj∗)  ∑
N
i 1
1 if qj∗ for all j,
x(qj∗)   0 if qj∗   qj j∗ for any j,
just as before.
This problem simply says that a staﬀ member at a nonproﬁt charter
school wants the school to maximize (  )/l, where   is total surplus (what
the for-proﬁt school would call proﬁt),   is a factor that is less than 1 (the
share of surplus that remains after it has been transformed into goods for
the staﬀ), and lis the number of staﬀ. Under this maximization problem, the
school’s incentives to expand enrollment are weaker (than those of a for-
proﬁt school), but its incentives to maximize productivity are strong. The
school will still be driven out by competitors if it does not produce the max-
imum quality qattainable given the constraint that its costs must not exceed
the ﬁxed charter school fee.
Two comments about the nonproﬁt school’s maximization problem are
in order. First, if there are economies of scale, the school will have stronger
incentives to expand enrollment than suggested just above. Second, one’s
measure of the productivity of a nonproﬁt school may slightly understate its
true productivity if the school earns surplus and buys staﬀ rewards with it
that appear to be inputs (although they really make no contribution to out-
comes that parents value). The understatement will be slight because com-
petition among nonproﬁt schools will drive the surplus toward zero (even
as each seeks to maximize its surplus).
  [px(q) – c(q,l,w,k,r)x(q)]
   
l
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The case of a nonproﬁt school that takes voucher students is just like the
case of a for-proﬁt school that takes voucher students except that its surplus
can be distributed only in the indirect way described above. That is, the
voucher school’s maximization problem is
(6) maxp,q,l,k 
(   
l
 )
   
The nonproﬁt voucher school must maximize productivity if it is not to lose
its enrollment to a similar school that oﬀers higher quality for the same fee
p. The only complication is that the school needs to choose its fee and qual-
ity simultaneously, and the only caveat is that the school has weaker incen-
tives to expand enrollment than a for-proﬁt voucher school.
8.3.5 A Summary for Fee-Based Schools (For-Proﬁt and Nonproﬁt)
In all of the cases above, the school’s revenues are derived from student
fees. It is this fee basis that is crucial because it means that parents’ choices
determine whether a school is viable or not. If a school’s students are en-
ticed away by a competing school that charges the same fees, the school nat-
urally has to increase its productivity (either by raising its quality for the
given fee or lowering the fee it charges for its quality). As shown, the for-
proﬁt or nonproﬁt basis of the school is somewhat less crucial. A for-proﬁt
schooling ﬁrm will have stronger incentives to enter new markets and gain
new enrollment, but both nonproﬁts and for-proﬁts have incentives to max-
imize productivity.
People often wonder whether there will be an elastic supply of charter or
voucher schools. This is an important question, especially for nonproﬁts,
which do not have clear incentives to expand when they hope to earn only
a slim surplus on additional students. If there are economies of scale, then
the charter school fee or voucher that makes a school viable with a small
number of students should guarantee that it is more than viable with higher
enrollment. Thus, economies of scale suggest that both for-proﬁts and non-
proﬁts should have elastic supply once they are in business. On the other
hand, there are some factors that might function like diseconomies of scale.
For instance, a charismatic principal might become uninspiring if he or she
managed a large school and therefore had little direct contact with students.
Buildings are often discussed as a possible factor that would limit the
elasticity of supply of charter or voucher schools. This, however, would
seem to be a short-run phenomenon that mainly plagues the start-up of new
charter or voucher programs. The total number of students to be taught
does not increase simply because a new school has entered, so the intro-
duction of charter or voucher school competition does not require much of
a net increase in school building. As enrollment shifts from less productive
    [px(q) – c(x, q, l, w, k, r)x(p, q)]
    
l
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iting schools and purchased by the expanding or entering schools. In fact,
there isan active market for school buildings and similar institutional build-
ings. If small fractions of school buildings could be sold easily, competition
would require no net increase in school buildings. Schools are, however,
somewhat indivisible: Although parts of school buildings are often sold or
leased to separate schools, only certain fractions of a building will generally
make a viable school. (For instance, most schools require an entrance area,
a set of bathrooms, and so on.) Realistically, then, competition requires a
small increase in the total stock of school buildings, simply to allow more
ﬂexibility as parents’ ability to choose makes enrollment more variable.
In any case, it is clear that some factors (economies of scale) suggest that
school supply will be very elastic, whereas other factors (which function like
diseconomies of scale) suggest that school supply will be less elastic. The
elastic response of charter and voucher schools is, thus, an empirical ques-
tion and will depend on features of the reform, such as funds for the refur-
bishment of buildings.
8.3.6 Competition and the Productivity of Regular Public Schools
Does competition give regularpublic schools incentives to be productive?
We have seen that fee-based schools face straightforward incentives, but
what about regular public schools that are funded mainly by taxes?
If a regular public school faces competition from a charter or voucher
school, and the charter school fee or voucher comes directly from its bud-
get, then the regular public school is fee-based at the margin and will have
marginal incentives to be productive. Whether these marginal incentives
work well or not depends on the size of the fee or voucher. Some vouchers
or fees are so small relative to regular per-pupil spending that they give
public schools perverse incentives to drive students away. That is, a voucher
or charter school fee that is small relative to per-pupil spending (or that is
not financed from the public school’s revenues) raises per-pupil spending
nonnegligibly for each student who is driven away from the public schools.
Public school staﬀmay be able to enjoy greater surplus if they drive students
away than if they try to attract them. Such perverse scenarios can be easily
avoided by setting a suﬃciently high voucher or charter school fee.
What if, however, a regular public school does not face competition from
a charter or voucher school? If it is not fee-based at the margin, does it have
any incentives to be productive? The answer is yes if the public school is ﬁ-
nanced by local property taxes and faces a high degree of traditional choice
among public school districts.
Traditional choice among public school districts is what occurs when
parents choose a school district by choosing a residence. This traditional
form of choice is by far the most pervasive and important form of choice in
American elementary and secondary schooling today. In order that this
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parents choose among districts that are ﬁscally independent. The mecha-
nism that I am about to describe does not work with intradistrict choice.
Conventionally, public school districts in the United States have revenues
that depend largely on local property taxes. If parents in a metropolitan area
can choose among a large number of districts, they will tend to favor districts
that produce higher achievement for a given local property tax liability or,
equivalently, have lower local tax liability for a given level of achievement.
That is, parents will tend to favor districts with high productivity. If a school
district’s productivity falls, it will be avoided by parents who happen to be
moving. The resulting decrease in the demand for its houses will drive down
the district’s property prices. The falling property tax base will, in turn, drive
down the school’s budget, which depends on property tax revenues. The ad-
ministrator will be encouraged to raise productivity, either by maintaining
achievement in the face of a falling budget or by raising achievement suﬃ-
ciently to make the district attractive to home buyers again.
Notice that, although only a fraction of households are moving at any
given time, their observations of achievement and tax liabilities are “uni-
versalized” through the housing market so that every family’s house price
changes in such a way as to give schools incentives to be productive. Notice
also that this productivity-inducing mechanism is sustainable over the long
term because it depends on decentralized choices.13 This is in contrast to
centralized reward systems—for example, ﬁnancial or other merit awards
for successful school districts that are distributed by the state. Centralized
rewards tend to be unsustainable because state governments cannot, ex
post, credibly adhere to systems that reduce the amount of money going to
failing school districts.
8.4 Finding Evidence on How Choice Aﬀects School Productivity
In the next two sections of this paper, I show evidence on how choice
aﬀects school productivity. The next section focuses on traditional forms of
choice (parents choosing among independent school districts and parents
choosing private schools). Section 8.6 focuses on recent choice reforms:
vouchers and charter schools. There are, however, some problems that arise
in any analysis of how choice aﬀects productivity, and the purpose of this
section is to explain them.
8.4.1 The Endogenous Availability of Choice Options
One problem that plagues analysis is the fact that choice options do not
arise randomly, but are frequently a response to school conduct. In partic-
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13. The mechanism described is the subject of Hoxby (1999b), where it is described in much
more detail.ular, when people are dissatisﬁed with a particular school’s conduct, they
try to create alternative schools for themselves or maintain their access to
existing alternative schools.
It is easy to see this phenomenon with respect to the creation (or mainte-
nance) of private schools, charter schools, and voucher programs. In an
area where the public schools are bad, parents are frustrated and are will-
ing to make some eﬀort or devote some money to obtaining alternative
schooling. A collapse in the quality of local public schools (as sometimes oc-
curs when an administrator leaves or school ﬁnance laws change) tends to
send families scurrying toward local private schools. The result is an area in
which private schooling is common because the public schools are bad. A
recent illustration of this phenomenon is the substantial increase in private
schooling that followed California’s school finance equalization (Downes
and Schoeman 1998).
Recent voucher and charter initiatives also illustrate this phenomenon. It
is no accident that Washington, D.C. has both a voucher program and a
rapidly growing population of charter schools. The Washington, D.C. dis-
trict has historically had low productivity: Its per-pupil spending is in the
99th (highest) percentile for the United States, yet its average student scores
between the 10th and 20th percentiles on the NAEP. Reports of malfea-
sance in the D.C. public schools, including the theft of school supplies and
payrolls padded with nonworkers, are common.14
Although the mechanism is less obvious, choice options existing because
the public schools are bad is a problem that also plagues traditional choice
among public school districts. It turns out that voters resist district consol-
idation in areas where one or more districts (usually the largest central city
district) has bad productivity. In areas where all the districts have good pro-
ductivity, voters elect to consolidate them in order to enjoy economies of
scale. In districts with bad productivity, subareas are keen to secede and
form another district, whereas, in districts with good productivity, no such
secessions occur. The end result of such phenomena is that areas with many
districts often contain one or more districts with bad productivity.
Endogenous school choice in areas with bad public schools generates
bias if a researcher naively estimates the eﬀect of choice on productivity. Be-
cause schools with poor productivity induce the creation of choice, it can
appear as though choice causes low productivity (instead of the other way
around). Researchers can avoid this bias only by (a) comparing the same
school district before and after a choice reform if panel data are available or
(b) ﬁnding a source of variation in the availability of choice that is not cor-
related with the underlying causes of bad school productivity. The ﬁrst so-
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14. The sources are U.S. Department of Education, Digest of Education Statistics(2000) and
U.S. Department of Education, National Assessment of Educational Progress Long-Term Trend
Summary Data Tables (2000).lution typically generates diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences strategies, in which
schools that are “treated” with choice reforms are compared, before and af-
ter the reform, to similar control schools (which did not experience the re-
form). The second solution typically generates instrumental variables
strategies, two of which are illustrated in section 8.5.
8.4.2 Unobserved Diﬀerences in Student Inputs That
Appear to Be Diﬀerences in Productivity
Some families provide many learning opportunities and resources for their
children at home; other families provide few. Children also diﬀer in motiva-
tion and innate ability. When measuring a school’s productivity, one should
fully account for diﬀerences in student inputs so that one avoids describing a
mediocre school as highly productive simply because it has such good stu-
dent inputs that achievement is high even if it adds very little learning (be-
yond what its students learn at home and pick up for themselves). It is not
possible, however, to measure all student inputs. In particular, motivation
and innate ability are usually not observed and cannot be controlled for.
For ﬁnding the eﬀect of choice on productivity, there are three ways that
researchers can deal with this problem. Suppose a researcher wants to com-
pare productivity across schools that face strong choice-based incentives
(such as voucher or charter schools) and schools that face weak choice-
based incentives (such as a large public school district that dominates a met-
ropolitan area). Then, the researcher must ensure that a random mecha-
nism (such as a lottery) that is notcorrelated with unobserved motivation or
ability assigns students to schools. If such a mechanism is at work, schools
will have an equal allocation of unobserved motivation or ability, and the
diﬀerence in achievement per dollar spent will accurately reﬂect true diﬀer-
ences in productivity. This approach is illustrated by Peterson et al. (chap. 4
in this volume).
An alternative is for a researcher to compare the achievement of all stu-
dents from an environment in which there is little or no choice to that of all
students from an environment in which there is a lot of choice. As long as
the students cannot choose the environment to which they belong, this
method generates good estimates. One example is comparing all students in
a metropolitan area with little choice to all students in a metropolitan area
with a great deal of choice. (Families are assumed to move among metro-
politan areas for reasons other than the availability of choice.)
A ﬁnal alternative is for a researcher to examine the achievement of stu-
dents who are unlikely to beneﬁt from choice unless it beneﬁts all students.
An example will illustrate this method. Suppose that a researcher wishes to
compare school productivity before and after a private school becomes
available, and the researcher sees that the private school draws students who
were previously high achievers in the public schools. The researcher can
compare measured productivity at the public schools before and after the
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ductivity is likely to rise only if the availability of private school choice ben-
eﬁts allstudents—that is, if the researcher may be reasonably conﬁdent that
a measured increase in public school productivity is not generated by un-
observed motivation and ability rising at the public school.
8.4.3 Measuring Productivity
Productivity is achievement per dollar spent in a school, and measuring
productivity raises a few measurement issues, mostly related to measuring
achievement. It goes almost without saying that one should avoid using
measures of achievement, such as grades, that have diﬀerent meanings in
diﬀerent schools and times. One should also avoid using scores on stan-
dardized tests that are taken by only a small, self-selected share of students,
such as the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT1) or American College Test
(ACT). Use of such tests generates self-selection bias that is impossible to
solve without the use of other standardized tests that are given to the entire
population of students. If one has such a populationwide standardized test,
however, one should use it instead of the SAT1 or ACT.
Supposing that one has a standardized test administered to the entire
population of students, there remains the question of whether to measure
productivity with reading scores, math scores, science scores, elementary
school scores, secondary scores, and so on. These are all valid measures of
productivity, and the researcher is best oﬀ presenting several (especially
math and reading). It is perfectly normal to ﬁnd that a school has better
productivity in some subjects or grades than in others. One may use scale
scores, national percentile scores, or any other score designed by the test-
maker to be comparable across schools and time.15
Measuring per-pupil spending presents few problems as long as the same
deﬁnition is used for all schools. One may use either current spending or
(preferably) total spending with smoothed capital expenditures.
8.5 The Eﬀect of Traditional Forms of School Choice on Productivity
Parents’ ability to choose among public school districts (through resi-
dential decisions) and to choose private schools are such established fea-
tures of American education that they are taken for granted. Through these
mechanisms, American parents have traditionally exercised some choice
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15. Wages and income later in life are additional measures of achievement that are useful
complements to measures based on standardized tests. They are useful because they are mean-
ingful to people in a concrete way and because they are measured in dollars, as is the denomi-
nator of productivity. There are, however, several problems with using wages and income to
measure achievement, including a paucity of data linked to schools, questionable validity for
women, and the impossibility of analyzing a reform until at least twenty years after its occur-
rence. I do not present wage-based measures of productivity here, but see Hoxby (2000b) for
some wage-based estimates.over their children’s schooling. These traditional forms of choice are useful
for predicting the eﬀects of choice on productivity, especially because the
availability of traditional choice mechanisms varies greatly across metro-
politan areas in the United States. Some metropolitan areas contain many
independent school districts and a large number of aﬀordable private
schools. Other metropolitan areas are completely monopolized by one
school district or have almost no private schooling.
In previous work, I have drawn upon traditional forms of choice to gen-
erate evidence about how choice aﬀects productivity. I review this evidence
here. In addition, I explain how traditional forms of choice generate im-
portant evidence on productivity that is otherwise unobtainable and illus-
trate empirical strategies for determining the eﬀects of traditional forms of
choice. For detail on the empirical work described here, see Hoxby (2000a,
b). Rather than providing such detail here, I reserve space for evidence on
the productivity eﬀects of recent choice reforms (section 8.6).
8.5.1 Traditional Interdistrict Choice
The ﬁrst traditional form of choice occurs when parents choose among
independent public school districts by choosing a residence. The degree to
which parents can exercise this form of choice depends on the number, size,
and housing patterns of districts in the area of the parents’ jobs. There are
some metropolitan areas in the United States that have many small school
districts with reasonably comparable characteristics. Boston, for instance,
has seventy school districts within a thirty-minute commute of the down-
town area and many more in the metropolitan area. Miami, on the other
hand, has only one school district (Dade County), which covers the entire
metropolitan area. Most metropolitan areas are, of course, somewhere be-
tween these two extremes. A typical metropolitan area has an amount of
choice that corresponds to having four equal-sized school districts (or a
greater number of unequally sized districts).
People with jobs in rural areas typically have only one or two school dis-
tricts among which to choose. To avoid a much-choice/little-choice com-
parison that mainly reﬂects urban-rural diﬀerences in school productivity,
it is useful to focus on metropolitan areas when analyzing traditional inter-
district choice.
It is essential that parents choose among districts that are ﬁscally and
legally independent if this traditional form of choice is to be useful guide to
the productivity eﬀects of choice. This is because the mechanism previously
described, by which parents’ housing choices translate into incentives for a
school to be productive, does not operate if, say, a district relies entirely on
state revenue or is otherwise held harmless from repercussions associated
with an inability to attract parents. Intradistrict choice among schools does
not provide useful evidence about productivity eﬀects because the schools
in a district are ﬁscally dependent on one another, by deﬁnition.
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metropolitan area? A particularly good index of interdistrict choice is the
probability that, in a random encounter, two students in the metropolitan
area would be enrolled in diﬀerent school districts. If there were only one
district, as in Miami, this probability would be equal to zero. If there were
many districts, as in Boston, this probability would be very close to one
(greater than 0.95). We can calculate this choice index, Cm, using the fol-
lowing equation:






jm is the square of district j’s share of enrollment in metropolitan
area m. Table 8.2 lists the names and choice indexes of metropolitan areas
School Choice and School Productivity 307
Table 8.2
Metropolitan Areas with the Most Choice Metropolitan Areas with Very Little
among Public School Districts Choice among Public School Districts
Metropolitan Area Choice Index Metropolitan Area Choice Index
Albany, N.Y. 0.97 Honolulu, Hawaii 0
Bergen-Pasaic, N.J. 0.97 Miami, Fla. 0
Boston, Mass. 0.97 Las Vegas, Nev. 0
Pittsburgh, Pa. 0.96 Fort Lauderdale, Fla. 0
Riverside-San Bernardino, 0.96 Daytona Beach, Fla. 0
Calif. Fort Myers, Fla. 0
Monmouth-Ocean, N.J. 0.96 Albuquerque, N.Mex. 0
Minneapolis, Minn. 0.96 Hagerstown, Md. 0
Atlantic City, N.J. 0.95 Jacksonville, N.C. 0
San Francisco, Calif. 0.95 Sarasota, Fla. 0
St. Louis, Mo. 0.95 Odessa, Tex. 0
Binghamton, N.Y. 0.94 Cheyenne, Wyo. 0
York, Pa. 0.94 Lakeland/Winter Haven, 0
Scranton, Pa. 0.94 Fla.
Johnstown, Pa. 0.94 Reno, Nev. 0
San Jose, Calif. 0.94 Boca Raton, Fla. 0
Dayton, Ohio 0.94 Wilmington, N.C. 0
Allentown, Pa. 0.94 Ocala, Fla. 0
Anaheim-Santa Ana, Calif. 0.94 Melbourne/Palm Bay, Fla. 0
Seattle, Wash. 0.94 Panama City, Fla. 0
Rochester, N.Y. 0.94 Bradenton, Fla. 0
Phoenix, Ariz. 0.94 Portland, Oreg. 0.07
Youngstown, Ohio 0.94 Midland, Tex. 0.11
Source: U.S. Department of Education (1994b).
Notes: Hawaii is one school district, so the school district is larger than the metropolitan area
of Honolulu. California has school districts that have almost no ﬁscal independence, so it is
somewhat deceptive to describe metropolitan areas like Riverside-San Bernardino, San Fran-
cisco, San Jose, and Anaheim-Santa Ana as having signiﬁcant choice among school districts.in the United States that have very high or low degrees of interdistrict
choice. It is interesting to note that metropolitan areas as disparate as Saint
Louis and Seattle have comparably high degrees of interdistrict choice.
Metropolitan areas as disparate as Las Vegas and Wilmington have zero in-
terdistrict choice.
8.5.2 Traditional Choice of Private Schools
The second way in which parents have traditionally been able to exercise
choice in the United States is by enrolling their children in private schools.
Traditionally, private school tuition in America is not subsidized by public
funds (as it is in Canada and many European countries), so parents can
only aﬀord private school if they can pay tuition and also pay taxes to sup-
port local public schools. Partly as a result, private schools enroll only 12
percent of American students.
In the United States, 85 percent of private school students attend a school
with religious aﬃliation, but such schools include a variety of Christian and
non-Christian schools and have tuition that ranges from a token amount to
over $10,000. The remaining 15 percent of private school students attend
schools with no religious aﬃliation; these include most of the independent,
college-preparatory schools that charge tuition of $5,000 or more. The
modal private school student in the United States attends a Catholic school
that charges between $1,200 and $2,700.
A key feature of American private schools is that they typically subsidize
tuition with revenues from donations or an endowment (or implicit rev-
enues from an in-kind endowment such as buildings and land). The share of
schooling cost that is covered by subsidies is larger in schools that serve low-
income students, but even relatively expensive private schools charge subsi-
dized tuition. For instance, Catholic elementary schools, on average, cover
50 percent of their costs with nontuition revenues.
The number of private school places (of a given quality) that are available
at a given tuition varies greatly among metropolitan area in the United
States.16 For instance, in some metropolitan areas, 15 percent of the ele-
mentary student population is enrolled in private schools where tuition is
about two-thirds of the schools’ per-pupil expenditure. (Typical amounts
would be tuition of $1,800 and expenditure of about $2,700). In other met-
ropolitan areas, fewer than 1 percent of the elementary school population
is enrolled in such schools, although places might be available in schools
where tuition is higher because there are no tuition subsidies. In short, the
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16. The quality of a private school can be measured in various ways, the simplest of which is
merely the amount of money the private school spends on educating a student. Because private
schools face strong incentives to be productive, their costs are a good guide to their quality.
Private school expenditure sometimes understates the true cost of educating a private school
student because, especially in schools with religious aﬃliation, labor is donated by volunteers
and church buildings are used for educational purposes.supply of private schooling varies among metropolitan areas, and, thus, so
does the degree to which parents have choice between public and private
schools.
It is reasonable to use the actual share of students who attend private
school in a metropolitan area as a measure of private school availability if
the measure is properly instrumented. The instruments must be variables
that cause the nontuition revenue of private schools to vary but are other-
wise unrelated to local public school achievement. That is, one wants to use
only the variation in private school availability that is generated by factors
that aﬀect the supply of private schooling, not by factors that aﬀect the de-
mandfor private schooling (such as the local public schools being bad). I de-
scribe the best available instruments below.
8.5.3 Why Evidence from the Traditional Forms of Choice is Necessary
Evidence from the traditional forms of choice is necessary because it can
reveal the long-term, general equilibrium eﬀects of choice. Evidence based
on recent reforms cannot.
In the short term, administrators who are attempting to raise their
school’s productivity to respond to competition have only certain options.
They can induce their staﬀ to work harder; they can get rid of unproduc-
tive staﬀ and programs; they can allocate resources away from non-
achievement-oriented activities (building self-esteem) and toward achieve-
ment-oriented ones (math, reading, and so on). In the slightly longer term,
they can renegotiate the teacher contract to make the school more eﬃcient.
If administrators actually pursue all of these options, they may be able to
raise productivity substantially.
Nevertheless, choice can aﬀect productivity through a variety of long-
term, general equilibrium mechanisms that are not immediately available to
an administrator. The ﬁnancial pressures of choice may bid up the wages of
teachers whose teaching raises achievement and attracts parents. Choice
may thus draw people into teaching (or keep people in teaching) who would
otherwise pursue other careers. Indeed, there is evidence that choice
changes the entire structure of rewards in teaching and could thereby trans-
form the profession. (It appears that schools under pressure from choice re-
ward teachers more on the basis of merit and allow administrators more
discretion in rewarding good teachers.)17 The need to attract parents may
force schools to issue more information about their achievement and may
thus gradually make parents into better “consumers.” Because parents’ de-
cisions are more meaningful when schools are ﬁnanced by fees they control,
choice may make schools more receptive to parent participation. The need
to produce results that are competitive with those of other schools may
force schools to recognize and abandon pedagogical techniques and curric-
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17. See Hoxby (2002b) for more on this point.ula that are unsuccessful in practice although philosophically appealing.
Finally, in the long term, choice can aﬀect the size and very existence of
schools. Choice makes districts’ enrollment expand and contract; it makes
private schools enter and exit. In the short term, we mainly observe how the
existing stock of schools changes its behavior.
Both traditional forms of choice potentially create the long-term, general
equilibrium eﬀects that interest us.
8.5.4 The Eﬀect of Traditional Interdistrict
Choice on School Productivity
We have a good measure of the degree of interdistrict choice in a metro-
politan area: Cm, deﬁned above. We are concerned, however, that the inter-
district choice available is endogenous to the conduct of local public
schools; in particular, districts consolidate with productive districts but se-
cede from unproductive districts. To obtain unbiased estimates, we need ge-
ographic or historical factors that increase a metropolitan area’s tendency
to contain many independent districts but that have no direct eﬀect on con-
temporary public school conduct. As explained in Hoxby (2000b), streams
and rivers provide good instruments because, early in American history,
they were natural barriers that inﬂuenced the drawing of district bound-
aries. They increased students’ travel time to school, causing school dis-
tricts to be drawn smaller initially.18 They probably have no direct eﬀect on
how schools conduct themselves now.
Formally, the set of instruments for Cm is a vector of variables that mea-
sure the number of larger and smaller streams in a metropolitan area. I es-
timate the eﬀects of interdistrict choice using regressions in which the de-
pendent variable is either achievement (the numerator of productivity) or
per-pupil spending (the denominator of productivity).19 The key indepen-
dent variable is the choice index (instrumented). The key variation in the re-
gression is at the metropolitan area level, but I am able to control for a wide
range of background variables that might also inﬂuence schools or stu-
dents. For instance, I control for the eﬀect of household income, parents’
educational attainment, family size, single-parent households, race, region,
metropolitan area size, and the local population’s income, racial composi-
tion, poverty, educational attainment, and urbanness. Because I have good
measures of racial, ethnic, and income segregation by school and school
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18. This typically took place about the time of Anglo-American settlement, which varies
with the area of the country. Many of the original petitions for district boundaries cite streams
as a reason for not extending the district lines further. Streams are by far the most common
natural boundary for school districts. Note, however, that many of the streams that are pre-
served in boundaries are small and have never had industrial importance. Today, many of the
boundary streams are of negligible importance in travel.
19. Per-pupil spending is the denominator in the measure of productivity. Because I com-
pare productivity across metropolitan areas with widely varying costs of living, I adjust per-
pupil spending using the Bureau of Labor Statistics metropolitan cost-of-living indexes.district, I can even control for segregation that may be aﬀected by inter-
district choice.
The principal results of these regressions are shown in table 8.3, which
displays only the coeﬃcients of interest, not the coeﬃcients on control vari-
ables. The estimates show that interdistrict choice has a positive, statisti-
cally signiﬁcant eﬀect on productivity.20 We can see this by looking at the
two components of productivity: achievement (the numerator of produc-
tivity), which is shown in the top panel of the table; and per-pupil spending
(the denominator of productivity), which is shown in the bottom panel.
The top panel shows that a metropolitan area with maximum interdis-
trict choice (index approximately equal to 1) has eighth-grade reading
scores that are 3.8 national percentile points higher, tenth-grade math
scores that are 3.1 national percentile points higher, and twelfth-grade read-
ing scores that are 5.8 national percentile points higher. All of these eﬀects
School Choice and School Productivity 311
Table 8.3 Eﬀect of Traditional Interdistrict Choice on Productivity of Public Schools
8th-Grade 10th-Grade 12th-Grade
Reading Score Math Score Reading Score
Eﬀect on Achievement (numerator of productivity) 
An increase of 1 in the index of interdistrict choice  3.818** 3.061** 5.770**
(no choice to maximum choice) (1.591) (1.494) (2.208)
Eﬀect on Per-Pupil Spending (denominator of productivity) 
An increase of 1 in the index of interdistrict choice  –7.63%**
(no choice to maximum choice) (3.41)
Sources: The main source for this table is Hoxby (2000b). Observations are metropolitan area students
from the National Education Longitudinal Study. The number of observations in each column are 10,790
(from 211 metropolitan areas), 7,776 (from 211 metropolitan areas), and 6,119 (from 209 metropolitan
areas). The number of observations varies due to the availability of the dependent variable. Other data
sources are the U.S. Department of Education (1993, 1994b), U.S. Department of Commerce (1994), and
U.S. Geological Survey (1994).
Notes: Test scores are measured in national percentile points. Per-pupil spending is measured in natural
log points so that the eﬀect of choice is recorded in percentage terms. The coeﬃcients shown come from
instrumental variables estimation of regressions in which the dependent variable is one of the achieve-
ment measures shown or per-pupil spending. The independent variables in the regression include the in-
dex of choice (instrumented by a vector of streams variables; see text), several family background vari-
ables (household income, gender, race, parents’ education), several neighborhood variables (mean
household income in district, income inequality in district, racial composition of district, racial and eth-
nic homogeneity of district, educational attainment of adults in district), and several characteristics of the
metropolitan area (population, land area, mean household income, income inequality, racial composi-
tion, racial homogeneity, ethnic homogeneity, educational attainment of adults, homogeneity of educa-
tional attainment, region of the country). The regressions are weighted by school enrollment. Standard
errors are in parentheses and use formulas (Moulton 1986) for data grouped by districts and metropoli-
tan areas.
**Statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 95 percent level of conﬁdence.
20. I consistently use the words “statistically signiﬁcant” to mean “statistically signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero (for a two-sided test) with at least 90 percent conﬁdence.”are statistically signiﬁcant with at least 95 percent conﬁdence. The bottom
panel of table 8.3 shows that this better achievement is attained with lower
per-pupil spending. Per-pupil spending is 7.6 percent lower in metropolitan
areas where interdistrict choice is at its maximum level (choice index equal
to 1), as opposed to its minimum level (choice index equal to 0). The com-
bination of the top and bottom panels is striking: Schools can simulta-
neously have signiﬁcantly higher achievement and signiﬁcantly lower
spending only if their productivity is substantially higher.
8.5.5 The Eﬀect of Traditional Private School
Choice on School Productivity
Recall that availability of private schooling varies among metropolitan
areas in the United States. To estimate the eﬀects of varying private school
competition for public schools, we need factors that aﬀect the supply of
private schooling but have no direct eﬀect on achievement. Such factors in-
clude historical diﬀerences in metropolitan areas’ religious composition be-
cause religious groups left endowments that today generate diﬀerences in
the amount of nontuition revenue enjoyed by private schools. A private
school presented by history with a generous endowment can provide a given
quality of schooling at a lower tuition (and can thus be more competitive
with public schools) than a private school with little or no endowment.
Formally, the set of instruments for the share of enrollment in private
schools is a vector of variables that measure the population densities of nine
major religious denominations in 1950. As long as I control for current re-
ligious composition of metropolitan areas (which might aﬀect the demand
for private schooling), these historical religious population densities should
mainly aﬀect the supply of schooling and should have little or no direct
eﬀect on the achievement of public school students.21 I estimate the eﬀects
of private school choice using regressions in which the dependent variable
is either achievement (the numerator of productivity) or per-pupil spending
(the denominator of productivity). The key independent variable is the per-
centage of metropolitan-area students in private schools (instrumented). I
control for the same background variables that I used for interdistrict
choice (see above).
The key estimates from these regressions are shown in table 8.4, which
displays only the coeﬃcients of interest, not the coeﬃcients on control vari-
ables. The table shows that private school choice has a positive, statistically
signiﬁcant eﬀect on publicschools’ productivity. For instance, compare two
metropolitan areas, one with a moderately high degree of private school
supply (about 17 percent of students in private schools) and the other with
a moderately low degree of private school supply (about 7 percent of stu-
dents in private schools). The diﬀerence between moderately high and low
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21. See Hoxby (2000a) for further comment on this point.private school choice is, thus, a 10 percentage point diﬀerence in the share
of students in private schools. This means that we can interpret the coeﬃ-
cient shown in the top panel of table 8.4 as follows. A public school in the
metropolitan area with moderately high private school choice (as opposed
to moderately low private school choice) has eighth-grade reading scores
that are 2.7 national percentile points higher, eighth-grade math scores that
are 2.5 national percentile points higher, twelfth-grade reading scores that
are 3.4 national percentile points higher, and twelfth-grade math scores
that are 3.7 national percentile points higher.
Of course, in order to see whether these eﬀects on achievement are gen-
erated by higher productivity or just higher spending, we need to examine
the eﬀect of private school choice on per-pupil spending in the public
schools. This result is shown in the bottom panel of table 8.4. Compared to
public schools in metropolitan areas with moderately low private school
choice, public schools in areas with moderately high private school choice
have per-pupil spending that is 0.53 percent (approximately half of 1 per-
cent) higher. Not only is this change very small, but it is not statistically sig-
niﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. In other words, traditional private school
choice has no eﬀect on public school spending. This is probably because of
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Table 8.4 Eﬀect of Traditional Private School Choice on Productivity of Public Schools
8th-Grade 8th-Grade 12th-Grade 12th-Grade
Reading Math Reading Math
Score Score Score Score
Eﬀect on Achievement (numerator of productivity) 
An increase of 1 in the index of interdistrict choice 0.271** 0.249** 0.342** 0.371**
(no choice to maximum choice) (0.090) (0.090) (0.172) (0.171)
Eﬀect on Per-Pupil Spending (denominator of productivity) 
An increase of 1 in the index of interdistrict choice 0.85%
(no choice to maximum choice) (0.68)
Sources: The main source for this table is Hoxby (2000a). Observations are metropolitan area students
from the National Education Longitudinal Study. Other data sources are U.S. Department of Education
(1993, 1994b) and U.S. Department of Commerce (1994).
Notes: Test scores are measured in national percentile points. The coeﬃcients shown come from instru-
mental variables estimation of regressions in which the dependent variable is one of the achievement mea-
sures shown. The independent variables in the regression include the percentage of metropolitan area stu-
dents enrolled in private schools (instrumented by a vector of religious composition variables from 1950;
see text), several family background variables (household income, gender, race, parents’ education), sev-
eral neighborhood variables (mean household income in district, income inequality in district, racial
composition of district, racial and ethnic homogeneity of district, educational attainment of adults in dis-
trict), and several characteristics of the metropolitan area (population, land area, mean household in-
come, income inequality, racial composition, racial homogeneity, ethnic homogeneity, educational at-
tainment of adults, homogeneity of educational attainment, region of the country). The regressions are
weighted by school enrollment. Standard errors are in parentheses and use formulas (Moulton 1986) for
data grouped by districts and metropolitan areas.
**Statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 95 percent level of conﬁdence.oﬀsetting eﬀects. Increased availability of private school choice draws some
students away from the public schools, raising per-pupil spending through
the reduction in the number of pupils served but lowering per-pupil spend-
ing through the reduction in voters who will support higher public school
spending.
In summary, the eﬀect of private school choice on productivity is sub-
stantial and occurs purely through an eﬀect on achievement: Per-pupil
spending in the public schools does not change, but their achievement is
higher.
8.5.6 Discussion of the Eﬀects of Traditional Forms of School Choice
Are the eﬀects of traditional choice on productivity large or small? One
way to answer this question is to ask how much higher American school
productivity would be if every school were to experience a high level of in-
terdistrict choice and private school choice, as opposed to zero interdistrict
choice and moderately low private school choice. There would be a 28 per-
cent improvement in American school productivity, based on the estimates
described above. 28 percent is close to half of the decline in American
school productivity since 1970.
One should keep in mind, however, that both traditional forms of choice
provide rather weak incentives compared to choice reforms like vouchers
and charter schools. Moreover, many poor families cannot exercise either
of the traditional forms of choice: A family can only choose among districts
if it can aﬀord to live in a variety of areas, and it can only exercise traditional
private school choice if it can pay tuition. Thus, even if every metropolitan
area in the United States had the maximum degree of the traditional forms
of choice, poor families would probably be left with relatively unproductive
schools.
8.6 The Eﬀect of Recent Choice Reforms on School Productivity
As mentioned above, recent choice reforms can only partially answer our
questions about how competition aﬀects productivity. The recent vintage of
most reforms means that we are unlikely to witness major changes in the
supply of schools. Also, short-term reactions to choice can diﬀer from long-
term reactions. For instance, consider a regular public school that has had
low productivity for years and that has become the target of voucher or
charter school competition. Under pressure, the school might make dra-
matic productivity gains in the short run. The principal might quickly elim-
inate unsuccessful instructional programs or personnel and reallocate re-
sources toward core instructional programs in reading, language, math,
history, and science. The rate of productivity increase might, however, slow
after the ﬁrst few years as good policy changes become less obvious. On the
other hand, even a school that is raising its productivity might appear to
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makes changes. For instance, a school that puts an academic monitoring
system in place may face short-run costs for computers and training.
Can we learn much, then, from recent choice reforms? The answer is yes
if we follow a few principles. First, although it is interesting to examine the
productivity of the choice schools themselves (as Peterson et al. implicitly
do in chap. 4 in this volume), it is even more important to study the pro-
ductivity reactions of regular public schools that are newly facing competi-
tion. This is because the productivity reactions of regular public schools are
in much more doubt than the productivity of choice schools. An unpro-
ductive choice school is unlikely to enter and even less likely to survive, but
critics of school choice doubt whether regular public schools even have the
knowledge or tools to raise their productivity. Second, we should focus on
the productivity reactions of regular public schools that face nonnegligible
incentives due to a choice reform. This immediately limits our investigation
to a few choice reforms that meet the following requirements: (a) There is a
realistic possibility that at least 5 percent of regular public enrollment could
go to choice schools; (b) the regular public schools lose at least some money
(not necessarily the entire per-pupil cost) when a student goes to a choice
school, and (c) the reform has been in place for a few years. Three reforms
that satisfy these basic requirements are school vouchers in Milwaukee,
charter schools in Michigan, and charter schools in Arizona. I describe
each of these reforms below in the course of examining the reaction to it.
Apart from these three reforms, most choice reforms fail to meet at least one
of these requirements. In fact, choice reforms are typically characterized by
constraints on enrollment (for instance, no more than 1 percent of local stu-
dents can attend choice schools) or perverse ﬁnancial incentives (for in-
stance, the local district loses no money when it loses a student to a choice
school).22
8.6.1 The Eﬀect of Vouchers on Achievement
in Milwaukee Public Schools
Vouchers for poor students in Milwaukee were enacted in 1990 and were
ﬁrst used in the 1990–91 school year. Currently, a family is eligible for a
voucher if its income is at or below 175 percent of the federal poverty level
(at or below $17,463 for a family of four).23 For the 1999–2000 school year,
the voucher amount was $5,106 per student or the private school’s cost per
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22. See Rees (2000) for a thorough review of current school choice reforms. In most cases
where I have not used materials directly obtained from the relevant state’s department of edu-
cation, I have relied upon Rees for a description of reforms.
23. As a rule, any child who is eligible for free or reduced-price lunch is also eligible for a
voucher. The actual cutoﬀ for reduced-price lunch is 185 percent of the federal poverty level,
but the diﬀerence between 175 percent (the cutoﬀ for the vouchers) and 185 percent is not rig-
orously enforced (and would be diﬃcult to enforce).student, whichever was less. For every student who leaves the Milwaukee
public schools with a voucher, the Milwaukee public schools lose state aid
equal to half the voucher amount (up to $2,553 per voucher student in
1999–2000). Milwaukee’s per-pupil spending in 1999–2000 was $8,752 per
pupil, so the district was losing 29 percent of the per-pupil revenue associ-
ated with a voucher student. Currently, the vouchers may be used at secular
and nonsecular private schools.24
The voucher program had a diﬃcult start. Although approximately
67,000 students were initially eligible for vouchers, participation was ini-
tially limited to only 1 percent of Milwaukee enrollment. In 1993, the limit
was raised to 1.5 percent and, in 1998, to 15 percent of enrollment. The 1998
changes followed a prolonged legal dispute in which most voucher students
had to use privately donated, not publicly funded, vouchers. For instance,
in 1997–98, only 1,500 students (about 1.4 percent of Milwaukee students)
were able to use publicly funded vouchers. Also, until 1998, the future of the
program was very much in doubt.25 Overall, although the voucher program
began in 1990 and might have been expected to have had a small impact on
the Milwaukee public schools beginning with the 1990–91 school year, the
program generated very little potential competition until the 1998–99
school year. However, because the program was already somewhat estab-
lished and familiar to Milwaukee residents by 1998, one would expect a
quicker response to the program than for a completely new program. In
short, it is plausible to look for a productivity impact, if any, over the few
most recent school years. The 1996–97 school year eﬀectively predates seri-
ous competition.
Not all schools in Milwaukee experienced the same increase in competi-
tion as the result of the voucher program. The greater a school’s share of
poor children, the greater the potential competition, because the greater
was the potential loss of students (after 1998). Some Milwaukee schools
had as few as 25 percent of their students eligible for vouchers, whereas
other Milwaukee schools had as many as 96 percent eligible. Also, because
private elementary schools cost signiﬁcantly less than private high schools,
more than 90 percent of vouchers were used by students in grades one
through seven in 1999–2000. Thus, only elementary schools in Milwaukee
faced signiﬁcant potential competition.
These facts about the voucher program suggest that the following type of
evaluation is most appropriate for examining the productivity response of
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24. The information on the Milwaukee program and Wisconsin schools is obtained from
several publications of the Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction (2000a–e).
25. The future of the program is still somewhat in doubt, for two reasons. First, state
supreme courts’ opinions conﬂict on the question of whether it is constitutional to have vouch-
ers that can be used at schools with religious aﬃliation. Therefore, it is likely that the U.S.
Supreme Court will eventually rule on such vouchers. Second, the Wisconsin legislature has
threatened to fund the vouchers at such a low level that they are unusable.Milwaukee public schools. First, one should focus on the productivity of
Milwaukee schools in grades one through seven. Second, schools’ produc-
tivity should be compared from 1996–97 (before signiﬁcant competition) to
1999–2000 (after signiﬁcant competition). Third, schools in Milwaukee can
be separated into those that were “more treated” by competition because a
large number of students were eligible and those that were “less treated.”
More-treated schools are likely to have responded more strongly to the pro-
gram. We can think of the less-treated schools in Milwaukee as a partial
control group, but all schools in Milwaukee were eligible for nonnegligible
treatment. Therefore, it is desirable to have a control group of schools from
Wisconsin that were truly unaﬀected by the voucher program. It turns out
that it is not easy to ﬁnd such schools in Wisconsin because Milwaukee’s
schools are much poorer and have much larger shares of black and Hispanic
students than most other schools in the state. I chose the most similar
schools available for the evaluation, but it is likely that the results will un-
derstate the productivity eﬀects of school competition. We expect under-
statement because schools that have fewer poor and minority students
typically enjoy greater productivity and higher productivity growth than
schools with more poor and minority students. Thus, the control schools,
which are richer than the treated schools, would probably have higher pro-
ductivity growth (all else being equal) than the treated group of schools.
Also, the less-treated schools in Milwaukee would probably have higher
productivity growth (all else being equal) than the more-treated schools.26
Because my evaluation compares treated and control schools before and
after 1998, it is what is sometimes called a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences evalua-
tion. It has a fairly obvious analog in scientiﬁc experiments.
Table 8.5 shows some demographic indicators for the three groups of el-
ementary schools: most treated (Milwaukee schools where at least two-
thirds of students were eligible for vouchers), somewhat treated (Milwaukee
schools where less than two-thirds of students were eligible for vouchers),
and untreated comparison schools. Note that 30 percent was the minimum
share of students eligible for vouchers among the somewhat treated Mil-
waukee elementary schools. There are thirty-two most-treated and sixty-six
somewhat-treated elementary schools. All of the Milwaukee elementary
schools have enrollment of about seventy-one to seventy-two students in a
grade.
In the most-treated schools, an average of 81.3 percent of students were
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26. It is fairly obvious that better-oﬀ schools will have better productivity if one does not
control for demographic diﬀerences among students. It is less obvious that better-oﬀ schools
will also have better productivity growth, but in fact they do. For instance, prior to 1996, Wis-
consin elementary students took statewide tests in reading (only). In the prevoucher period,
productivity growth was negative (based on these reading tests) in the schools that were later
to become most-treated and somewhat treated. In contrast, productivity growth (based on
reading tests) was positive in the schools that form the untreated comparison group.eligible for free or reduced-price lunches (and thus eligible for vouchers),
65.4 percent of students were black, and 2.9 percent of students were His-
panic. In the somewhat treated schools, an average of 44.5 percent of stu-
dents were eligible for vouchers, 49.1 percent of students were black, and
13.7 percent of students were Hispanic.27
I included a Wisconsin elementary in the untreated comparison group if
it (a) was not in Milwaukee, (b) was urban, (c) had at least 25 percent of its
students eligible for free or reduced-price lunch, and (d) had black students
composing at least 15 percent of its students. There were only twelve
schools in Wisconsin that met these criteria. It was not possible to choose a
group of untreated schools that were more closely matched to Milwaukee
schools. In the untreated comparison schools, average enrollment in a grade
was fifty-one students, 30.4 percent of students were eligible for free or
reduced-price lunch (and, thus, would have been eligible for vouchers had
they lived in Milwaukee), 30.3 percent of the students were black, and 3.0
percent of students were Hispanic.
Students in Wisconsin take statewide examinations in grades four, eight,
and ten. Because I am necessarily focusing on the productivity reactions of
elementary schools, I measure productivity by dividing a school’s fourth-
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Table 8.5 Demographics of Wisconsin’s Most-Treated, Somewhat Treated, and
Untreated Comparison Schools
% of Students % of Students % of Students
Eligible for Free/ Who Are Who Are
Reduced-Price Lunch Black Hispanic
Most-treated schools 81.3 65.4 2.9
Somewhat treated schools 44.5 49.1 13.7
Untreated comparison schools 30.4 30.3 3.0
Sources: Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction (2000a–e) and U.S. Department of Ed-
ucation (1994b).
Notes: “Most-treated” schools were Milwaukee elementary schools where at least two-thirds
of students are eligible for free or reduced price lunches (and thus eligible for vouchers). There
are thirty-two most-treated elementary schools, each of which has an average fourth grade en-
rollment of seventy-two students. “Somewhat treated” schools were Milwaukee elementary
schools where fewer than two-thirds of students are eligible for free or reduced price lunch (and
thus eligible for vouchers). In all of these schools, at least 30 percent of students are eligible for
free lunch. There are sixty-six somewhat treated elementary schools, each of which has an av-
erage fourth-grade enrollment of seventy-one students. The untreated comparison schools are
all the Wisconsin elementary schools that (a) are urban, (b) have at least 25 percent of their
students eligible for free lunch, and (c) have at least 15 percent of their students being black.
There are twelve untreated comparison elementary schools, each of which has an average
fourth-grade enrollment of ﬁfty-one students.
27. Note that all of these demographic numbers reﬂect what the schools looked like in 1990,
before the voucher program was enacted. This is the correct method for choosing treated and
control schools. One does not want to measure the extent of treatment using measures of stu-
dent composition that potentially reﬂect how students reacted to the voucher program.grade score (expressed in national percentile points) by its per-pupil spend-
ing in thousands of real (1999) dollars. Achievement is measured on ﬁve
tests: mathematics, science, social studies, language, and reading. It is
worth noting that, during the period in question, Wisconsin enacted a con-
troversial new reading curriculum that emphasized whole-language meth-
ods, as opposed to phonics.
Table 8.6 shows productivity growth rates in most-treated, somewhat
treated, and untreated comparison schools in Wisconsin between 1996–97
and 1999–2000. The statistics in the table are based on regressions in which
the dependent variable is productivity and the independent variables are an
indicator for each school, a time trend for most treated schools, and time
trend for somewhat treated schools, and a time trend for untreated com-
parison schools. This regression incorporates the best diﬀerences-in-
diﬀerences method, given the application, because it allows each school to
have its own starting point for productivity. Intuitively, the regression is
based on the idea that productivity growth rates might look like the follow-
ing ﬁgure.
Figure 8.1 shows what productivity might look like in three schools, one
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Table 8.6 Productivity Time Trends in Wisconsin Most-Treated, Somewhat Treated, and
Untreated Comparison Schools, from Regressions with School Fixed Eﬀects
Productivity Calculation is Based on Exam in:
Annual Change in  Social
Productivity by School Type Math Science Studies Language Reading
Most-treated schools  0.732a 0.889ac 0.475bc 0.248ad –0.035bd
(0.071) (0.072) (0.070) (0.066) (0.066)
Somewhat treated schools 0.527 0.729a 0.327 0.123b –0.141
(0.056) (0.057) (0.055) (0.052) (0.052)
Untreated comparison  0.342 0.255 0.188 –0.081 –0.235
schools (0.172) (0.176) (0.170) (0.160) (0.162)
Sources:Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction (2000a–e) and U.S. Department of Education (1994b).
Notes:Productivity is measured in national percentile points per thousand dollars of per-pupil spending,
where per-pupil spending is measured in 1999 dollars. The deﬂator used is the Consumer Price Index.
Each regression includes a ﬁxed eﬀect for each school, a time trend for most-treated schools, a time trend
for somewhat treated schools, and a time trend for untreated comparison schools. The observations are
school-level averages based on fourth-graders’ scores, and the regressions are therefore weighted by the
schools’ fourth-grade enrollment.
aTime trend is statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the time trend for untreated comparison schools at
the 95 percent level of conﬁdence.
bTime trend is statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the time trend for untreated comparison schools at
the 85 to 95 percent level of conﬁdence.
cTime trend is statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the time trend for somewhat treated schools at the
95 percent level of conﬁdence.
dTime trend is statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the time trend for somewhat treated schools at the
85 to 95 percent level of conﬁdence.of which is most treated, one of which is somewhat treated, and one of
which is untreated. It would be fairly typical to ﬁnd that the most-treated
schools had the lowest initial productivity if we did not correct for diﬀer-
ences in student demographics, for the simple reason that poorer students
tend to have lower achievement and the most-treated schools have more
poor students. Thus, the ﬁgure shows the most-treated school having the
lowest initial productivity, somewhat treated schools having medium initial
productivity, and untreated schools having the highest initial productivity.
If competition has little or no eﬀect on productivity, then the time trends for
productivity might all be stable, as indicated by the solid lines. On the other
hand, if competition makes schools raise their productivity, then the time
trends might look the dashed lines, in which the most-treated schools raise
their productivity the most, somewhat treated schools raise their produc-
tivity somewhat, and untreated schools raise their productivity the least (or
perhaps not at all).28
320 Caroline M. Hoxby
Fig. 8.1 How schools might change their productivity when facing competition
28. Actually, we expect the untreated schools to have higher initial productivity growth be-
cause richer schools tend to have better productivity growth, all else being equal. This tendency
(richer schools, higher productivity growth) will make the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimates
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where Achitis a national percentile rank score for students at school iin year
t, PPExpit is the per-pupil expenditure at school i in year t, I1 through IN are
indicator variables for schools,  1 through  N are initial productivity levels
at individual schools, Imost treated is an indicator variable for the school being
most treated, I somewhat treatedis an indicator variable for the school being some-
what treated, I untreatedis an indicator variable for the school being untreated,
and timet is the school year. The coeﬃcients  most treated,  somewhat treated, and 
 untreated pick up the diﬀerent productivity growth rates for most-treated,
somewhat treated, and untreated schools, respectively.
The left-hand column of table 8.6 shows that, based on mathematics
achievement, productivity grew annually by about 0.7 national percentile
points per thousand dollars between 1996–97 and 1999–2000 in the most-
treated schools. It grew more slowly in somewhat treated schools (about 0.5
national percentile points per thousand dollars) and yet more slowly in un-
treated schools (about 0.3 national percentile points per thousand dollars).
Productivity growth based on science, social studies, and language (gram-
mar) is shown in the next three columns, all of which show patterns that are
similar to the mathematics-based pattern. In all these columns, productiv-
ity growth in the most-treated schools is statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from that in the untreated schools, with a 95 percent conﬁdence level. Read-
ing-based measures of productivity are falling in all the schools over the pe-
riod in question, perhaps because of whole language methods. However,
reading-based productivity is falling least quickly in schools that were most
treated to voucher school competition.
Table 8.7 shows statistics that are very similar to those in table 8.6. They
are easier to interpret for those unfamiliar with regression analysis, but they
are less ideal because each school does not have its own initial level of pro-
ductivity. For instance, examine the top panel, which shows productivity
calculations based on the mathematics exam. In 1996–97, the most-treated
schools earned 4.18 national percentile points for every thousand dollars of
per-pupil spending. In the same year, the somewhat treated and untreated
schools earned 4.08 and 5.65 national percentile points (respectively) for
every thousand dollars. Over the next few years, however, productivity
growth was the highest in the most-treated schools, second highest in the
somewhat treated schools, and lowest in the untreated schools (see right-
hand column). In fact, by 1999–2000, productivity in the most-treated
schools was closer to that of the untreated schools than it was to that of the
somewhat treated schools! The productivity growth rates shown in table 8.7
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Productivity calculation is based on math exam
Most-treated schools 4.18 6.09 0.64
Somewhat treated schools 4.08 5.50 0.47
Untreated comparison schools 5.65 6.65 0.33
Productivity calculation is based on science exam
Most-treated schools 3.87 6.04 0.72
Somewhat treated schools 3.91 5.67 0.59
Untreated comparison schools 6.33 6.92 0.20
Productivity calculation is based on social studies exam
Most-treated schools 5.05 6.19 0.41
Somewhat treated schools 5.26 5.80 0.18
Untreated comparison schools 6.90 7.21 0.10
Productivity calculation is based on language exam
Most-treated schools 5.07 5.64 0.19
Somewhat treated schools 5.07 5.28 0.07
Untreated comparison schools 6.04 5.85 –0.06
Productivity calculation is based on reading exam
Most-treated schools 5.35 5.31 –0.01
Somewhat treated schools 5.46 4.98 –0.16
Untreated comparison schools 6.68 6.04 –0.21
Sources: Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction (2000a–e) and U.S. Department of Education
(1994b).
Notes:Productivity is measured in national percentile points per thousand dollars of per-pupil spending,
where per-pupil spending is measured in 1999 dollars. The deﬂator used is the Consumer Price Index. Sta-
tistics are based on weighted averages over schools in the relevant group, where each school is weighted
by its enrollment.
are dramatic for the most-treated schools. The basic pattern (highest pro-
ductivity growth in the most-treated schools) is repeated in the other pan-
els of the table, for the science, social studies, language, and reading exam-
inations.
Tables 8.8 and 8.9 are very much like tables 8.6 and 8.7, except that
they show achievement growth instead of productivity growth. That is,
they leave out the changes in productivity that come about as a result
of changes in per-pupil spending. An examination of them shows that
achievement growth displays patterns like that of productivity growth,
which suggests that the improvements in productivity in the most-treated
and somewhat treated schools occurred because achievement was rising
in those schools, not because achievement was holding steady while per-
pupil spending fell. (Indeed, use of the vouchers causes per-pupil spend-
ing to rise in the Milwaukee public schools, so if achievement were to hold
steady, productivity would fall if schools did not respond to competition
by raising it.)
Look, for example, at table 8.8. It shows that math scores rose by about 7School Choice and School Productivity 323
Table 8.8 Achievement Growth in Wisconsin’s Most-Treated, Somewhat Treated, and
Untreated Comparison Schools, from Regressions with School Fixed Eﬀects
Annual Change in Test Social
Scores by School Type Math Science Studies Language Reading
Most-treated schools 7.06ac 8.39ac 4.97bc 2.98ad 0.57bd
(0.61) (0.62) (0.59) (0.56) (0.57)
Somewhat treated schools 5.27 6.99a 3.68 1.88b –0.37
(0.48) (0.49) (0.46) (0.44) (0.45)
Untreated comparison schools 3.71 2.96 2.40 –0.10 –1.42
(1.48) (1.50) (1.43) (1.37) (1.38)
Sources: Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction (2000a–e) and U.S. Department of Education
(1994b).
Notes: Test scores are measured in national percentile points. Each regression includes a ﬁxed eﬀect for
each school, a time trend for most-treated schools, a time trend for somewhat treated schools, and a time
trend for untreated comparison schools. The observations are school-level averages for fourth-graders,
and the regressions are therefore weighted by the schools’ fourth-grade enrollment.
aTime trend is statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the time trend for untreated comparison schools at
the 95 percent level of conﬁdence.
bTime trend is statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the time trend for untreated comparison schools at
the 85 to 95 percent level of conﬁdence.
cTime trend is statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the time trend for somewhat treated schools at the
95 percent level of conﬁdence.
dTime trend is statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the time trend for somewhat treated schools at the
85 to 95 percent level of conﬁdence.
percentile points per year in the most-treated schools, by about 5 percentile
points per year in somewhat treated schools, and by about 4 percentile
points in untreated schools. Alternatively, examine table 8.9. It shows that
social studies scores in the most-treated schools rose by 4.2 percentile
points per year, whereas social studies scores in untreated schools rose by
only 1.5 percentile points per year.
Overall, an evaluation of Milwaukee suggests that public schools have a
strong, positive productivity response to competition from vouchers. The
schools that faced the most potential competition from vouchers had the
best productivity response. In fact, the schools that were most treated to
competition had dramatic productivity improvements. On the one hand,
such bursts of productivity growth may slow down after a few more years
of competition. On the other hand, the productivity eﬀects of competition
may be understated because the control group of schools was a slightly un-
fair comparison group, with fewer poor and minority students.
8.6.2 The Eﬀect of Charter Schools on Achievement
in Michigan Public Schools
In 1994, Michigan enacted a charter school law as part of a series of
changes in its method of ﬁnancing schools. Michigan charter schools receive
a per-pupil fee that is essentially the same as the state’s foundation level of
per-pupil spending (the state’s minimum level of per-pupil spending, giventhe characteristics of the school’s student population). For instance, in 1999–
2000, the average charter school student in Michigan had $6,600 spent on his
education, whereas the average regular public school student had about
$7,440 spent on his education. Detroit public schools spent $8,325 per pupil,
and the average charter school student in Detroit had about $6,590 spent on
his education. A district that loses a student to a charter school loses ap-
proximately the foundation level of per-pupil revenue. Charter competition
tends to be most substantial in the elementary grades because the charter
fees more adequately cover costs for the lower grades. By the 1999–2000
school year, approximately 3.5 percent of all nonprivate elementary students
in Michigan were enrolled in charter schools. The corresponding number for
secondary students was 0.7 percent. Charter schools can receive their char-
ters from statewide organizations, such as universities, so they can compete
with local public schools, unlike charter schools in many other states that
have their charters granted and renewed by their local district.29
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Table 8.9 Fourth-Grade Test Scores in Wisconsin’s Most-Treated, Somewhat
Treated, and Untreated Comparison Schools
1996–97 1999–2000 Annual Change
Math
Most-treated schools 34.5 53.3 6.3
Somewhat treated schools 33.7 48.2 4.8
Untreated comparison schools 50.0 60.6 3.5
Science
Most-treated schools 31.9 52.8 7.0
Somewhat treated schools 32.3 49.7 5.8
Untreated comparison schools 56.0 62.9 2.3
Social studies
Most-treated schools 41.6 54.2 4.2
Somewhat treated schools 43.4 50.7 2.4
Untreated comparison schools 61.0 65.6 1.5
Language
Most-treated schools 41.8 49.4 2.5
Somewhat treated schools 41.8 46.2 1.5
Untreated comparison schools 53.4 53.2 –0.1
Reading
Most-treated schools 44.2 46.5 0.8
Somewhat treated schools 45.1 43.6 –0.5
Untreated comparison schools 59.0 55.0 –1.3
Sources: Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction (2000a–e) and U.S. Department of Ed-
ucation (1994b).
Notes: Test scores are measured in national percentile points. Statistics are based on weighted
averages over schools in the relevant group, where each school is weighted by its enrollment.
29. The information on Michigan charter schools and all the data on Michigan schools are
taken from publications of the Michigan Department of Education (2000a–d).A diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences strategy, analogous to the strategy used on
Milwaukee, is appropriate for evaluating the eﬀect of charter school com-
petition on Michigan public schools. There are two additional issues, how-
ever, that did not arise with Milwaukee. First, it was easy to deﬁne ex ante
the treatment and control schools in Wisconsin: No school outside of Mil-
waukee received any voucher treatment, and the scale of treatment within
Milwaukee schools varied with students’ poverty, a variable that we ob-
serve. In Michigan, “treatment” and “control” and “before” and “after”
must be deﬁned on a district-by-district basis, so that a district is being
“treated” and is in the “after” period once it is forced to recognize that it is
losing a critical share of students to charter schools. Of course, we do not
know what this critical share might be, but it is useful to know that the mean
year-to-year change in a Michigan school’s enrollment prior to 1994was 5.1
percent. Therefore, a small drawing-away of enrollment by a local charter
school would be hard to diﬀerentiate from normal year-to-year variation in
enrollment. However, a persistent drawing-away of enrollment of more
than 5 percent, say, would be likely to be noticed and attributed to charter
schools. I initially looked for a critical level of 6 percent, and, because it
worked well, I kept it. A critical level of 7 or 8 percent works very similarly.30
The left-hand side of table 8.10 lists the Michigan districts in which char-
ter schools account for at least 6 percent of total enrollment inside the dis-
trict’s boundaries.31There are 597 districts in Michigan and only 34 listed in
the table, so a nonnegligible charter school presence is still the exception
and not the rule. Michigan’s large city districts are well represented among
the districts that face charter school competition: Detroit, Lansing, and
Kalamazoo all have at least 6 percent of enrollment in charter schools.
Second, the Michigan districts that had to face competition from charter
schools were not selected randomly or according to a simple rule. Instead,
charter schools probably formed as a response to local circumstances. In
some cases, charter schools may have formed where parents were unusually
active and concerned about education (good circumstances for public
school productivity and achievement). In other cases, charter schools may
have formed where parents and teachers were frustrated because the district
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30. Results for a critical level of 7 or 8 percent are available from the author. If one chooses
a critical level much higher than 8 percent, the results depend unduly on just a few districts,
simply because only a few districts ever face more than an 8 percent drawing-away of their stu-
dents. Descriptive statistics for the Michigan data set are also available from the author.
31. Note that the charter schools’ share of local enrollment is based, in table 8.10, on the as-
sumption that students attend charter schools in the district in which they reside. Because stu-
dents who are in particularly unappealing districts are disproportionately likely to attend a
charter school outside their district if they do attend a charter school, the statistics on which
the table is based slightly understate the enrollment losses of bad districts. It is possible to con-
struct estimates of the share of a district’s students who attend charter schools, but such esti-
mates are somewhat noisy and (in any case) generate results that are qualitatively similar to the
results shown in tables 8.11 and 8.12. The alternative set of results may be found in the work-
ing paper version of this paper, available from the author.326 Caroline M. Hoxby
Table 8.10 Michigan School Districts and Arizona Municipalities Where at Least 6
Percent of Enrollment Entered Charter Schools







































































Sources: Michigan Department of Education (2000a–d) and Arizona Department of Educa-
tion (2000a–d).
Notes: The share of students who live in a district and attend charter schools is diﬃcult to cal-
culate because students can attend charter schools located outside of their districts (Michigan)
or municipality (Arizona). These statistics are calculated under the assumption that students
attend a charter school located in their district (Michigan) or municipality (Arizona).
aVery large city district (enrollment in one grade typically exceeds 1,000).
bLarge city district (enrollment in one grade is typically between 500 and 1,000).
was run poorly (bad circumstances for public school productivity and
achievement). Thus, it is important that the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences strat-
egy look within a school—that is, how a given school changes when it is
faced with new competition. I present diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences results that
control for school ﬁxed eﬀects, which pick up all the unobserved character-
istics of a school that are stable over the several-year period that I analyze.
The diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences strategy might not be convincing, however,
if the districts that were eventually forced to complete with charter schools
had preexisting productivity trends that were diﬀerent from other public
schools in Michigan. Diﬀerent preexisting trends would not be unlikely be-
cause charter schools chose where to locate: A charter school would expect
to ﬁnd little demand for its services in a district that was improving rapidly
on its own. In cases where diﬀerent trends are possible, a more sophisti-
cated, detrended diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences strategy is appropriate. There-
fore, I also present estimates of how schools’ productivity trends changed
when they began to face charter competition.Figures 8.2 through 8.4 illustrate why a detrended diﬀerences-in-
diﬀerences strategy can be a useful complement to a typical diﬀerences-in-
diﬀerences strategy. In ﬁgure 8.2, the top line represents the productivity of
district A, which initially enjoys strong positive productivity growth. The
bottom line represents the productivity of district B, which initially has very
low productivity growth. Suppose that charter schools are deterred from
entering district A because it is already improving rapidly and parents are
pleased with the current course of events. Suppose that charter schools do
enter district B, however, and are able to claim a critical share of local par-
ents (who were not pleased with the course that the public school was on)
by 1996. Finally, suppose that the district B does not respond to the charter
school competition: It remains on its initial path after 1996. A simple diﬀer-
ences-in-diﬀerences strategy would compare the change in district A’s level
of productivity to the change in district B’s levelof productivity. (Notice the
indications on the ﬁgure of possible “before” and “after” points that could
be used for comparison). In such a comparison, charter school competition
would seem to have a negative eﬀect (although it truly has no eﬀect), simply
because charter schools enter where districts’ productivity trends are al-
ready worse. On the other hand, if we compared the change in district A’s
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Fig. 8.2 The fact that there is no reaction to competition can be discerned, even
with diﬀerent preexisting trendstrend in productivity to the change in district B’s trend in productivity, we
would correctly see that district B did not respond to competition.
Figures 8.3 and 8.4 illustrate situations in which district B responds pos-
itively when it begins to face charter school competition (ﬁgure 8.3) and re-
sponds negatively when it begins to face competition (ﬁgure 8.4). Observe
that the diﬀerence between district A’s change in trend and district B’s
change in trend is an accurate indicator of the response to charter school
competition. In short, the advantage of detrended diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
is that it generates consistent estimates even when schools that eventually
face charter competition have diﬀerent preexisting trends from schools that
never face competition. The disadvantage of detrended diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerences is that it demands a lot of information from the data because
each school’s preexisting trend in achievement (not just its level of achieve-
ment) must be identiﬁed. Because it is so demanding statistically, detrended
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences will not generate statistically signiﬁcant estimates
of eﬀects that are small. Thus, we can foresee that the estimated eﬀects for
higher grades (which are likely to be small because charter competition
aﬀected them relatively little) are likely to be hard to identify using de-
trended diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences.
To  summarize, it is important that diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences strategies
control for each school’s initial conditions (levels or trends). We need to
control for schools’ unobservable characteristics, especially characteristics
that might attract charter competition. Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences strategies
also control for what was happening to Michigan schools in general over
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Fig. 8.3 A positive reaction to competition can be discerned, even with diﬀerent
preexisting trendsthe period. This is important as well because Michigan enacted a major
school ﬁnance reform in 1994 that aﬀected all schools in the state. The
strategies will identify changes that occurred in schools facing competition,
above and beyond whatever occurred in other schools in the state (which
were presumably responding to the ﬁnance reform).
I use regression to carry out both the simple diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
analysis and the detrended diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences analysis. The top panel
of table 8.11 presents the estimated eﬀect of charter school competition on
productivity, using the simple diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences analysis. The bot-
tom panel presents the estimated eﬀect on productivity, using the detrended
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where Achit is the scale score for school i in district j in year t, PPExpit is the
per-pupil expenditure for the same school, Ischool is a vector of school indi-
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Fig. 8.4 A negative reaction to competition can be discerned, even with diﬀerent
preexisting trendscator variables,  school ﬁxed eﬀectsis the vector of school ﬁxed eﬀects, Iyearis a vec-
tor of year indicator variables,  year is the vector of year ﬁxed eﬀects, 
Icharter 6%is an indicator variable for the district’s having at least 6 percent of
enrollment in charter schools, and  critical charter competition picks up the eﬀect of
facing a critical level of charter competition. Note that the year ﬁxed eﬀects
pick up changes over time in the test or in the pressure to perform well on
the test. The school ﬁxed eﬀects pick up unobserved characteristics of each
school that are stable.
The regression used in the bottom panel of table 8.11 is identical, except
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The estimates in the top panel of table 8.11 indicate that Michigan public
schools raised their productivity in response to competition from charter
schools. Productivity rose by 1.60 (scale points per thousand dollars spent)
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Table 8.11 Eﬀects of Charter School Competition on Michigan Public Schools’ Productivity
4th-Grade 4th-Grade 7th-Grade 7th-Grade
Reading Math Reading Math
Exam Exam Exam Exam
Dependent Variable (productivity based on exam) 
Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences (levels)
Change in productivity level after district 1.60** 1.37** 1.87** 1.53**
is faced with charter school competition (0.45) (0.39) (0.86) (0.73)
Dependent Variable (change in productivity based on exam) 
Detrended diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
Change in productivity trend after district 0.31* 0.27* 0.15 0.06
is faced with charter school competition (0.17) (0.14) (0.46) (0.54)
Source: Michigan Department of Education (2000a–d).
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Regressions include school ﬁxed eﬀects and year ﬁxed eﬀects.
Charter schools represent at least 6 percent of enrollment in district. The table is based on regressions of
school-level data from 1992–93 to 1999–2000. In the top panel, the dependent variable is a school’s pro-
ductivity—speciﬁcally, a school’s scale scores divided by its per-pupil spending in thousands of 1999 dol-
lars. In the bottom panel, the dependent variable is the trend (annual change) in a school’s productivity
(or this year’s productivity minus last year’s). The regression includes school indicator variables to pick
up characteristics of schools that are constant over the period (location, neighborhood, organization) and
year indicator variables that allow for statewide changes from year to year in the test itself or in the pres-
sure to perform on the test. The inﬂator for per-pupil spending is the Consumer Price Index. The numer-
ator for productivity is the school’s scale score on the Michigan Assessment of Educational Progress
(MEAP) tests, which are administered to fourth- and seventh-graders. See the text for details on the tests.
**Change in productivity is statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero with 95 percent conﬁdence.
*Change in productivity is statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero with 90 percent conﬁdence.based on the fourth-grade reading exam, by 1.37 based on the fourth-grade
mathematics exam, by 1.87 based on the seventh-grade reading exam, and
by 1.53 based on the seventh-grade mathematics exam. All of these esti-
mates are statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero with a high level of
conﬁdence.
Moreover, the bottom panel of table 8.11 shows that charter school com-
petition made Michigan public schools improve their productivity relative
to their own initial trends. Productivity trends based on fourth-grade tests
improve to a degree that is statistically signiﬁcant. Not surprisingly, given
the greater impact of charter competition on lower grades, the seventh-
grade results are statistically insigniﬁcant.
It is diﬃcult to interpret productivity improvements until we know
whether they arise as a result of improvement in achievement or a fall in per-
pupil spending, or both phenomena occurring simultaneously. Therefore,
table 8.12 examines the eﬀects of charter competition on achievement. Its
structure is identical to that of table 8.11, except that it shows results for
achievement instead of productivity. That is, it leaves out the changes in
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Table 8.12 Eﬀects of Charter School Competition on Michigan Public Schools’ Achievement
4th-Grade 4th-Grade 7th-Grade 7th-Grade
Reading Math Reading Math
Exam Exam Exam Exam
Dependent Variable (productivity based on exam) 
Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences (levels)
Change in achievement level after district 1.21** 1.11* 1.37** 0.96*
is faced with charter school competition (0.65) (0.62) (0.60) (0.48)
Dependent Variable (change in achievement based on exam) 
Detrended diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
Change in achievement trend after district 2.40* 2.50** 0.25 0.77
is faced with charter school competition (1.37) (1.04) (0.58) (0.69)
Source: Michigan Department of Education (2000a–d).
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Regressions include school ﬁxed eﬀects and year ﬁxed eﬀects.
Charter schools represent at least 6 percent of enrollment in district. The table is based on regressions of
school-level data from 1992–93 to 1999–2000. In the top panel, the dependent variable is a school’s
achievement—speciﬁcally, a school’s scale scores on the Michigan Assessment of Educational Progress
(MEAP) tests, which are administered to fourth- and seventh-graders. In the bottom panel, the depend-
ent variable is the trend (annual change) in a school’s scale scores (this year’s achievement minus last
year’s). The regression includes school indicator variables to pick up characteristics of schools that are
constant over the period (location, neighborhood, organization) and year indicator variables that allow
for statewide changes from year to year in the test itself or in the pressure to perform on the test. From
1992 to 2000, the means and standard deviation of schools’ average scores (weighted by the number of
test-takers) were mean of 611, standard deviation of 19 on fourth-grade reading; mean of 528, standard
deviation of 16 on fourth-grade math; mean of 600, standard deviation of 17 on fourth-grade reading;
mean of 521, standard deviation of 14 on fourth-grade math.
**Change in achievement is statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero with 95 percent conﬁdence.
*Change in achievement is statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero with 90 percent conﬁdence.productivity that come about as a result of changes in per-pupil spending.
Table 8.12 shows that the eﬀect of charter school competition on achieve-
ment looks much like the eﬀect on productivity, which suggests that Michi-
gan’s regular public schools raised their productivity mainly by raising their
achievement for a given level of per-pupil spending, rather than by main-
taining a steady level of achievement and cutting their per-pupil spending.
For instance, the top panel of table 8.12 shows that fourth-grade reading
and mathematics scores were, respectively, 1.21 and 1.11 scale points higher
in schools that faced charter competition after they began to face competi-
tion. Seventh-grade reading and mathematics scores were, respectively, 1.37
and 0.96 scale points higher. Recall that these improvements in scores are
not only relative to the schools’ own initial performance (the ﬁrst diﬀer-
ence), but also relative to the gains made over the same by schools that did
not face charter competition (the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences).
The bottom panel of table 8.12, which shows detrended diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerences results, shows how the schools facing charter competition
accomplished these achievement gains. For instance, examine the fourth-
grade reading and mathematics coeﬃcients, which are statistically signiﬁ-
cant. (The seventh-grade detrended diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences coeﬃcients
are, as in table 8.11, statistically insigniﬁcant.) Schools that faced charter
competition raised their annual improvement in achievement by 2.40 scale
points a year in fourth-grade reading and 2.50 scale points in mathematics.
Recall that this is a change relative to their previous rate of change in
achievement, which was actually about 0.4 scale points lower on average
than that of schools that were never faced with charter competition. In fact,
the results give us a picture much like that shown in ﬁgure 8.4: The achieve-
ment trend of schools that eventually face charter competition is initially
lower than that of other schools, but, once charter competition commences,
schools that face competition have a higher rate of growth.
The change in achievement for schools subjected to charter competition
is statistically signiﬁcant and positive, but it is not unrealistically large, par-
ticularly when one considers that such schools were making up for years of
slower achievement growth. Even with mathematics and reading achieve-
ment growth that is about 2.5 scale points per year better than that of other
schools, a district like Detroit would take approximately two decades to
catch up with the achievement of one of its aﬄuent suburbs, like Grosse
Point. (Of course, it is possible that, as Detroit caught up, a suburb like
Grosse Point would feel competitive pressure to increase its own rate of
achievement growth. This would lengthen the catch-up period but further
raise Michigan students’ scores.)
Overall, the picture that one draws from Michigan is the following. Public
schools that were subjected to charter competition raised their productivity
and achievement in response, not only exceeding their own previous perfor-
mance but also improving relative to other Michigan schools not subjected
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appear to occur once charter competition reaches a critical level that coin-
cides with the enrollment at which charter schools’ taking students would be
easily discernible (not to be confused with regular ﬂuctuations in enroll-
ment). The increase in productivity and achievement is larger and more pre-
cisely estimated in fourth grade, probably because elementary schools faced
more competition from charter schools than middle schools did.
8.6.3 The Eﬀect of Charter Schools on 
Achievement in Arizona Public Schools
Like Michigan, Arizona enacted a charter school law in 1994. Arizona’s
charter school law is widely regarded as the most favorable to charter
schools in the United States, as it allows charter schools to have consider-
able ﬁscal and legal autonomy. There are also few constraints on the growth
of charter schools in Arizona. As a result, 5.3 percent of Arizona’s nonpri-
vate enrollment was in charter schools in 1999–2000. This percentage is the
highest of any American state.
In Arizona, state-sponsored charter schools get a fee equal to the state’s
share of revenue (45 percent of total revenue for a regular public school).
District-sponsored charter schools get a fee equal to local per-pupil revenue
but are less able to compete with the regular public schools because they
must seek renewal of their charters from the very districts with which they
compete.
My evaluation of Arizona follows the same strategy as I employ for
Michigan, so I will merely highlight a few diﬀerences between the Michigan
and Arizona situations here. In Arizona, a municipality may contain mul-
tiple districts: for instance, a few elementary districts, a middle school dis-
trict, and a high school district. A local charter school may therefore be
competing with multiple districts. Therefore, I associate regular public
schools and charter schools with a municipality, not a district. All Arizona
fourth- and seventh-graders were required to take the Iowa Test of Basic
Skills (ITBS) through 1995–96 and have been required to take the Stanford
9 test since then. The shift in the test does not pose problems for the analysis
because both tests oﬀer national percentile rank scores (which have a 0.97
correlation at the school level). Moreover, all of the schools switched tests in
the same year, so it is simple to establish each school’s prereform trend and
postreform trend allowing for a statewide shift in the intercept.32 I use na-
tional percentile rank scores at the school level for the school years from
1992–93 to 1999–2000. I again use 6 percent of enrollment as the critical
level at which charter schools are held to be a nonnegligible competitive
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32. More precisely, a separate statewide shift is estimated for each percentile rank. The in-
formation on Arizona charter schools and all the data on Arizona schools are taken from pub-
lications of the Arizona Department of Education (2000a–d).threat. I use the same critical level as I use for Michigan in order that the two
states’ results be as comparable as possible. However, a variety of critical lev-
els between 6 percent and 11 percent produce similar results for Arizona.33
The right-hand panel of table 8.10 lists the Arizona municipalities that
had at least 6 percent of local enrollment in charter schools. Municipalities
of all sizes are represented. The list includes some of Arizona’s largest cities
(Phoenix, Tempe, Scottsdale), some medium-sized cities (Avondale, Flag-
staﬀ, Gilbert, Kingman), and thirty smaller municipalities.
As in Michigan, it is important that the Arizona diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
strategies control for each school’s initial conditions. We need to control for
schools’ unobservable characteristics, particularly because some of those
characteristics may actually attract charter competition. Also, it is impor-
tant that the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences strategy generate estimates that con-
trol for what was happening to Arizona schools in general over the period.
Although Arizona did not experience a major school ﬁnance reform, it did
have a very activist state department of education that enacted numerous
programs (including a school report card program so that parents would be
better informed about performance).
Table 8.13has the same structure as table 8.11: The eﬀect of charter com-
petition on productivity is estimated using diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences in the
top panel and using detrended diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences in the bottom
panel. The equations estimated are (9) and (10), shown above.
The estimates in the top panel of table 8.13 suggest that Arizona public
schools raised their productivity in response to competition from charter
schools. Productivity rose by 0.55 (national percentile points per thousand
dollars spent) based on the fourth-grade reading exam, by 0.70 based on the
fourth-grade mathematics exam, by 0.38 based on the seventh-grade read-
ing exam, and by 0.53 based on the seventh-grade mathematics exam. All of
these estimates are statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero with a high
level of conﬁdence.
The bottom panel of table 8.13 shows that charter school competition
made Arizona public schools improve their productivity relative to their own
initial trends. Productivity trends based on fourth-grade tests improve to a
degree that is statistically signiﬁcant. The seventh-grade results are statisti-
cally insigniﬁcant, but this is not surprisingly because charter competition
had a greater impact on lower grades.
As noted previously, interpreting productivity gains is hard until we look
at one of the components of productivity separately. Table 8.14 shows the
eﬀect of charter competition on achievement—that is, it leaves out the
changes in productivity that come about as a result of changes in per-pupil
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33. These results and descriptive statistics for the Arizona data set are available from the au-
thor. Choosing a level much higher than 11 percent makes the results depend unduly on just a
few districts, simply because only a few districts ever face more than an 11 percent drawing
away of their students.spending. The table has the same structure as the previous two tables. It
shows that the eﬀect of charter school competition on achievement looks
much like the eﬀect on productivity, which suggests that Arizona’s regular
public schools raised their productivity mainly by raising their achievement
for a given level of per-pupil spending, rather than by maintaining a steady
level of achievement and cutting their per-pupil spending. The top panel of
table 8.14 shows that fourth-grade reading and mathematics scores were, re-
spectively, 2.31 and 2.68 national percentile points higher in schools that
faced charter competition after they began to face competition. Seventh-
grade mathematics scores were 1.59 national percentile points higher. (The
estimate for seventh-grade reading is statistically insigniﬁcant.) These are
important gains, especially when one recalls that these gains are relative not
only to the schools’ own initial performance (the ﬁrst diﬀerence), but also
to the gains made over the same period by schools that did not face charter
competition (the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences).
The bottom panel of table 8.14 shows the detrended diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerences results, which suggest that schools facing charter competition
raised achievement relative to their own previous trends. Such schools
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Table 8.13 Eﬀects of Charter School Competition on Arizona Public Schools’ Productivity
4th-Grade 4th-Grade 7th-Grade 7th-Grade
Reading Math Reading Math
Exam Exam Exam Exam
Dependent Variable (productivity based on exam) 
Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences (levels)
Change in productivity level after district 0.55** 0.70** 0.38* 0.53**
is faced with charter school competition (0.16) (0.19) (0.21) (0.17)
Dependent Variable (change in productivity based on exam) 
Detrended diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
Change in productivity trend after district 0.31* 0.28** 0.33 0.35
is faced with charter school competition (0.17) (0.13) (0.22) (0.26)
Source: Arizona Department of Education (2000a–d).
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Regressions include school ﬁxed eﬀects and year ﬁxed eﬀects.
Charter schools represent at least 6 percent of enrollment in district. The table is based on regressions of
school-level data from 1992–93 to 1999–2000. In the top panel, the dependent variable is a school’s pro-
ductivity—speciﬁcally, a school’s national percentile rank (NPR) score divided by its per-pupil spending
in thousands of 1999 dollars. In the bottom panel, the dependent variable is the trend (annual change) in
a school’s productivity (this year’s productivity minus last year’s). The regression includes school indica-
tor variables to pick up characteristics of schools that are constant over the period (location, neighbor-
hood, organization) and year indicator variables that allow for statewide changes from year to year in the
test itself or in the pressure to perform on the test. The inﬂator for per-pupil spending is the Consumer
Price Index. The numerator for productivity is the school’s national percentile rank on a nationally
normed standardized test (the Iowa Test of Basic Skills or the Stanford 9). See the text for details on the
tests.
**Change in productivity is statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero with 95 percent conﬁdence.
*Change in productivity is statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero with 90 percent conﬁdence.raised their annual improvement in achievement by 1.40 national percentile
points a year in fourth-grade reading and 1.39 national percentile points in
mathematics. Recall that this is a change relative to their previous rate of
change in achievement, which was actually about 0.6 national percentile
points loweron average than that of schools that were never faced with char-
ter competition. Again, the results give us a picture much like that shown in
ﬁgure 8.4: Schools that eventually face charter competition start with lower
rate of growth in achievement but begin to catch up with higher growth
rates once charter competition commences.
The improvements in achievement among schools subjected to charter
competition are signiﬁcant, but not unrealistically large. Even if its scores
rise about 1.4 national percentile points more each year than do the scores
of schools that do not attract competition, the typical Phoenix area school
that is now competing with charter schools will take ten years to catch up
with top-performing Phoenix area schools.
Overall, the evaluation of Arizona suggests conclusions that are broadly
similar to those one draws from the Michigan evaluation. Charter compe-
tition focused on public schools that initially had below-average achieve-
ment and productivity growth, but charter competition induced public
schools to improve their productivity and achievement. The improvements
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Table 8.14 Eﬀects of Charter School Competition on Arizona Public Schools’ Achievement
4th-Grade 4th-Grade 7th-Grade 7th-Grade
Reading Math Reading Math
Exam Exam Exam Exam
Dependent Variable (achievement based on exam)
Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences (levels)
Change in achievement level after district 2.31** 2.68** 1.11 1.59*
is faced with charter school competition (0.69) (0.79) (0.95) (0.89)
Dependent Variable (change in achievement based on exam)
Detrended diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
Change in achievement trend after district 1.40* 1.39* 1.48 1.29
is faced with charter school competition (0.79) (0.81) (1.13) (1.10)
Source: Arizona Department of Education (2000a–d).
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Regressions include school ﬁxed eﬀects and year ﬁxed eﬀects.
Charter schools represent at least 6 percent of enrollment in district. The table is based on regressions of
school level data from 1992–93 to 1999–2000. In the top panel, the dependent variable is a school’s
achievement—speciﬁcally, a school’s national percentile rank (NPR) score on a nationally normed stan-
dardized test (the Iowa Test of Basic Skills or the Stanford 9). See the text for details on the tests. In the
bottom panel, the dependent variable is the trend (annual change) in a school’s achievement (this year’s
achievement minus last year’s). The regression includes school indicator variables to pick up characteris-
tics of schools that are constant over the period (location, neighborhood, organization) and year indica-
tor variables that allow for statewide changes from year to year in the test itself or in the pressure to per-
form on the test.
**Change in achievement is statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero with 95 percent conﬁdence.
*Change in achievement is statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero with 90 percent conﬁdence.are relative to the schools’ own past performance and also relative to gains
made, over the same period, by schools that were not subjected to charter
competition.
8.6.4 Discussion of the Eﬀects of Recent School Choice Reform
Are the productivity eﬀects of the Milwaukee vouchers, Michigan char-
ter schools, and Arizona charter schools suﬃcient to make us think that
choice could remedy the American school productivity problem? All three
forms of choice did boost productivity. If all schools in the United States
were to enjoy productivity growth rates like those in Milwaukee’s most-
treated schools, American schools could return to their 1970–71 productiv-
ity levels in under a decade. Of course, we should be cautious about extrap-
olating from the short voucher and charter school experiences described in
this section. On the one hand, the bursts of productivity growth seen in Mil-
waukee may settle down to a lower level of growth. On the other hand, many
of the long-term, general equilibrium eﬀects of choice are not yet in opera-
tion.
In order to get a sense of the magnitude of the productivity eﬀects, with-
out having to extrapolate so much, consider the following alternative ques-
tion. Is it likely that the productivity eﬀects of Milwaukee’s voucher pro-
gram (the “rising tide”) are likely to overwhelm the allocation eﬀects for
students who experience the worst possible allocation changes in Milwau-
kee? We can get a sense of the students who are available in Milwaukee to
be reallocated if we examine the very high scoring (top decile) and very low
scoring (bottom decile) elementary schools in the city. Such schools score
about 32 national percentile points apart on the math exam. Thus, a Mil-
waukee student’s worst-case scenario would be to experience a fall of
about 32 national percentile points in his or her peer group. Moreover, let
us make the extreme assumption that the student is very strongly inﬂu-
enced by his or her peers so that the student’s scores fall by 32 points. This
scenario is truly pessimistic! It is not strictly impossible, but it is so pes-
simistic that it is barely plausible. Nevertheless, if the student enjoys the
achievement growth rates that Milwaukee students in the most-treated
schools are enjoying now, he or she will “grow out of” the bad allocation
eﬀects within 4.5 years. That is, the student will be better oﬀ for having ex-
perienced vouchers within ﬁve years of the voucher program’s aﬀecting his
or her schooling.
Many commentators on school choice are obsessed with the possibility
that choice schools will “cream-skim” from the public schools. Thus, it
seems odd even to raise the possibility of reverse cream-skimming. Never-
theless, given that public school students are positively aﬀected by choice,
one might worry that the eﬀects are due to reverse cream-skimming. It is,
however, easy to show that the eﬀects of choice on public school students
cannot be largely the result of reverse cream-skimming: There are simply
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they were actually aﬀected. For instance, between 1996–97 and 1999–2000,
the Milwaukee public schools lost no more than 498 fourth-graders to
voucher schools. (The actual number is smaller because 498 is the total in-
crease in vouchers for fourth-graders, and some of the vouchers went to
students who had previously been attending private schools, not the Mil-
waukee public schools). Witte, Sterr, and Thorn (1995) inform us that
disappointed voucher applicants (applicants who lost the lottery and there-
fore remained in the Milwaukee public schools) scored 5.6 points lower in
reading and 10.2 points lower in math than the average Milwaukee student.
They also show that voucher applicants performed at about the same level
as other low-income Milwaukee students who were eligible for the vouch-
ers. If we assume that the departing voucher students were like the disap-
pointed applicants, then their departure would raise fourth-grade scores in
Milwaukee public schools by at most 0.4 points in reading and 0.8 points in
math between 1996–97 and 1999–2000. These gains would imply an annual
improvement of 0.14 points in reading and 0.26 points in math. Compare
such improvements to 1.3 points in reading and 1.8 points in math, which
are the actual annual gains of Milwaukee public school students, above and
beyond the gains recorded by the control students in non-Milwaukee
schools. (The just-quoted numbers can be derived from table 8.9, once you
know that there were 2,376 students in schools facing more competition
and 4,554 in schools facing less competition.) In short, the change in Mil-
waukee scores that could plausibly be caused by reverse cream-skimming is
an order of magnitude too small to account for the actual change in Mil-
waukee scores.
For Michigan and Arizona, there are no scores available for disappointed
charter applicants, but I have compared the demographics of charter school
students and regular public school students in these states elsewhere
(Hoxby 2000a). For instance, in Michigan’s ten largest districts, some char-
ter schools enroll a higher share of black students, some charter schools en-
roll a smaller share of black students, and some charter schools enroll a vir-
tually identical share of black students as the regular public schools do. In
the ten next largest districts, there is a similar lack of pattern. In Arizona,
charter schools’ shares of Hispanic students typically diﬀer by only few per-
cent from those of their municipalities. Moreover, there is no consistent pat-
tern to the diﬀerences that do exist. In short, demographic data suggest that
cream-skimming and reverse cream-skimming are not important phenom-
ena in Michigan and Arizona.
8.7 Conclusions
In this paper, I have presented evidence that suggests that we should care
deeply about the productivity eﬀects of school choice, not only because they
potentially relieve tensions generated by the allocation eﬀects of choice but
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boost American schools’ productivity are sorely needed, if only to return
the schools to their 1970 productivity levels.
I have also explained how schools that face choice-driven incentives can
be induced to raise their productivity. I presented models of for-proﬁt
choice schools, nonproﬁt choice schools, and even regular public schools
that just face interdistrict choice.
In section 8.5 of the paper, I show evidence that traditional forms of
choice raise school productivity. I present results for traditional forms of
choice because they can have long-term, general equilibrium eﬀects of pro-
ductivity, such as may arise when schools enter or exit or when a diﬀerent
reward system draws better individuals into teaching. If all schools in the
United States experienced high levels of the traditional forms of choice,
school productivity might be as much as 28 percent higher than it is today.
In section 8.6 of the paper, I present evidence on three recent choice re-
forms: vouchers in Milwaukee, charter schools in Michigan, and charter
schools in Arizona. In each case, I ﬁnd that regular public schools boosted
their productivity when exposed to competition. In fact, the regular pub-
lic schools responded to competitive threats that were surprisingly small.
In each case, the regular public schools increased productivity by raising
achievement, not by lowering spending while maintaining achievement. This
achievement-oriented response may, of course, be related to the nature of
the actual reforms. One can summarize the productivity eﬀects of a reform
like Milwaukee’s voucher program by noting that a student would have bet-
ter achievement in ﬁve years under the voucher program even if his peer
group plunged by the maximum amount possible in Milwaukee and his
achievement fell one-for-one with that of his peer group.
Of course, one must be cautious about extrapolating unduly from recent
reforms or traditional forms of school of choice that only partially mimic
choice reforms. Nevertheless, it seems safe to conclude that analyses that ig-
nore the productivity eﬀects of choice are likely to be misleading. Improve-
ments in productivity may be the key eﬀects of choice.
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